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Dear Colleagues:
In this inaugural Faculty Spotlight Journal, we highlight some of the 
scholarly work of our most recently tenured faculty. Their scholarship 
places them at the apex of their respective fields: law and education, 
immigration and labor law, law and race, criminal theory, and empirical 
studies in criminal law. The academic contributions in these pages 
represent just a small selection of the formidable body of work of each of 
these professors. I hope this sample encourages you to become better 
acquainted with their research.
Scholarship at Fordham Law does not happen in a vacuum. Our 
professors collaborate with each other and discuss their ideas and 
projects with their peers and, just as importantly, with their students. 
When professors are able to share their ideas openly and freely, the 
resulting scholarship exhibits an energy and weight that can only come 
from a communal exchange of ideas.
At Fordham Law, we foster this sense of community among our students 
and professors alike. Our students, benefitting from the abiding 
commitment to open academic discourse, become the legal leaders of 
tomorrow. And our professors become the scholars whose compelling, 
original work distinguishes them as leaders of legal academia.
Michael M. Martin
Interim Dean and University Distinguished Professor in Law
FORE WORD
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The following pages feature the scholarship of five recently tenured 
Fordham Law faculty members. The work of each of these scholars 
is both timely and trenchant. As emerging leaders of their respective 
fields, they are indelibly shaping the landscape of contemporary legal 
scholarship. These scholars carry on the best of the Fordham tradition 
of an unwavering commitment to scholarly excellence.
Jennifer Gordon’s groundbreaking scholarship is uniquely shaping the 
debate around immigration and labor policy in this country. Her highly 
praised proposal for “Transnational Labor Citizenship” is a powerful  
rethinking of the relationship between immigration and labor standards. 
Her work adeptly moves between history, economic theory, and policy 
and reflects her longstanding commitment to facilitating the free move-
ment of people across borders while preventing the erosion of working 
conditions within host countries.
Youngjae Lee is a brilliant theorist whose scholarship wrestles with fun-
damental questions concerning the system of condemnation and blame 
found in criminal law. In approaching these questions, Lee has focused 
on the type of problems that arise when evaluations of criminal culpabil-
ity must make direct references to the moral significance of the state. 
Lee’s work carefully and incisively explores the various justifications for 
the existence and scope of state power in light of the appropriate level of 
condemnation for certain offenses.
IN TRODUCT ION
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Robin A. Lenhardt is a rising star among second-generation critical race theorists. Characteristic of her 
approach to questions of racial equality, her article on racial stigma offers a disciplined and systematic 
analysis of racial harm in constitutional jurisprudence. Her commitment to creating a thicker conception 
of equality also extends to the idea of equal citizenship. There, she advances the idea of “belonging” 
as a way to understand the ways in which racial and gender exclusion from marriage are deeply and 
conceptually linked.
John Pfaff has emerged as one of the leading scholars in empirical legal studies. His early work deftly 
examined significant empirical questions in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Blakely v. Washington opinion 
declaring mandatory sentencing guidelines unconstitutional. Committed to improving the use of empirical 
work in legal scholarship, his scholarship on criminal sentencing and incarceration has highlighted the 
methodological shortcomings of much of the existing empirical work in the field while developing new 
models to elucidate the factors that have contributed to the striking surge in U.S prison rates.
Aaron Saiger’s original and sophisticated scholarship is revitalizing the field of education law and policy. 
A proponent of more nuanced strategies for dealing with aspects of local politics and policy that make 
educational reform difficult, Saiger posits that our understanding the “black box” of education—the 
processes that turn inputs like money and teachers into desired educational outcomes—is very imperfect. 
He argues that legislatures, courts, and policymakers must eschew both false optimism about technology 
and the presumption that the black box is unknowable. They should focus on establishing rules and 
institutional incentives that encourage experimentation towards productive educational technologies.
Sheila Foster
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
Albert A. Walsh ‘54 Chair in Real Estate, Land Use and Property Law
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Working Hard and Working Right
Immigration law scholars have long grappled with finding the right policies for an era characterized by 
increasing mobility across national boundaries. Many countries—including the United States—have 
responded by attempting to reinforce their borders, and yet migrants continue to arrive outside the legal 
regime. The presence of large numbers of “illegal” workers in destination country labor markets has raised 
vexing questions about the relationship between immigration policy and domestic labor regulation.
Few people are as well situated to address these questions as Professor Jennifer Gordon. A Harvard Law 
graduate, Professor Gordon joined Fordham in 2003 after many years working to improve wages and 
employment conditions for immigrant workers. During that time, she founded the nonprofit Workplace 
Project on Long Island, for which she was awarded a MacArthur “Genius” Fellowship. Her book, 
Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights (Belknap/Harvard University Press), powerfully 
captures her efforts as an advocate and organizer on behalf of immigrant workers. 
Since coming to Fordham, Professor Gordon has established herself as one of the nation’s leading think-
ers in immigration and labor law. Professor Gordon is exceptionally adept at cutting to the heart of the 
most difficult puzzles that lie at the intersection of immigration and labor policy. She advocates for a 
commitment to an immigration policy that approaches global movement as a product of the interaction 
between migrant origin and destination nations (rather than as an appropriate subject for unilateral regu-
lation), and that above all seeks to reinforce a baseline level of workers’ rights for both immigrant workers 
and the native-born. To do so, she has urged a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between immi-
gration and labor standards. 
Her proposal to create a “Transnational Labor Citizenship,” for example, has twice been praised by the 
New York Times as offering a way out of a major policy conundrum.* Every nation that receives labor 
migrants worries that they will undermine wages and working conditions for the workers in that coun-
try. Yet the way that destination countries like the United States structure their immigration policies 
makes it very difficult for migrant workers to access their rights. And so, migrant workers become an 
ever cheaper and more appealing source of labor. In her work, Gordon reconceptualizes the relation-
ship between governments, civil society institutions, and private actors as way out of this dilemma. Her 
proposal offers a way to facilitate the free movement of people while preventing the erosion of working 
conditions in host countries.
What distinguishes Professor Gordon’s work is the sharpness and creativity with which she moves 
between history, economic theory, and policy. As her recent work suggests, in addition to proposing pro-
vocative resolutions of current policy conundrums, she will continue to locate and interrogate emerging 
approaches to regulating human mobility in a context of global inequality. 
* Lawrence Downes, “Worker Solidarity Doesn’t Have to Stop at the Rio Grande,” Editorial Observer, Opinion Page, 
September 30, 2007; Editorial, “A Shift on Immigration,” Opinion Page, May 2, 2009.
Jennifer Gordon
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Excerpts
People Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade
Forthcoming, 104 Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 3 (2010)
If economists’ models predict that free trade, foreign investment, and immigration will behave so simi-
larly in terms of maximizing global wealth, what accounts for the weak global regulation of immigration 
as opposed to the highly developed global mechanisms regulating trade and investment? The simplest 
of responses points to realpolitik: trade and investment are arenas where most nations are aggressively 
seeking new relationships on favorable terms, while immigration is an area where developed countries 
display considerable ambivalence in the face of developing nations’ great interest.1 But this answer 
begs the fundamental question: if immigration offers even greater efficiency gains than trade, why are 
developed nations so reluctant to permit greater openness, and to pursue that goal in coordination with 
developing countries? In Part I, I noted and rejected an explanation rooted in classical economics: that 
the difference is accounted for by the fact that trade and migration are substitutes for each other.2 In this 
Part, I argue instead that labor mobility is fundamentally different from the mobility of goods or capital 
in several ways, each of which contributes either to wealthier nations’ reluctance to permit greater global 
movement of workers, or to their distaste for multilateral structures governing labor migration, or both. 
Before beginning, however, a reiteration of the parallels between kinds of factor mobility is in order. In the 
classical economic lineup, trade and migration appear to produce a similar set of winners and losers. In 
the trade setting, if a U.S.-based commercial baker imports flour from abroad, the foreign firm selling the 
flour benefits from higher prices than it could command in its domestic market. The U.S. baker benefits 
from cheaper flour. Consumers benefit from the lower prices of the crackers the baker produces. The 
losers are U.S. based flour-producers, whose prices fall as a result of competition with foreign produc-
ers, and their workers, who lose jobs (although as consumers, they also benefit to a very small degree 
from cheaper crackers). In the immigration context, if a U.S.-based tomato canning firm uses immigrant 
workers on its production line in the United States, the immigrant benefits from higher wages than she 
could earn at home. The U.S. firm benefits from cheaper labor. Consumers benefit from the lower prices 
of the canned tomatoes. And the losers are the group of workers in the United States who compete with 
migrants for jobs; their wages fall because of the increased labor supply (although they, too, benefit a tiny 
bit from the decreased cost of the product).
Furthermore (and not surprisingly, given the similarities just noted), many of the charges levied against 
the importation of goods and the importation of labor echo each other. Trade is critiqued for displacing 
workers from jobs in the importing country, and for replacing traditional products and practices with 
1 This essay gives short shrift to the complex, ambivalent, and varied perspectives of developing countries on migra-
tion, not by any means because they lack importance, but because they do not shed much light on the question that 
occupies this essay, ie, why developed nations have responded in such disparate ways to the movement of goods and 
people across borders.  
2 There are two variations of this argument: the outsourcing claim (trade will render immigration unnecessary 
because the jobs will move to where the workers are) and the wage equalization claim (trade will render immigration 
unnecessary because it will raise wages and increase employment opportunities in less-developed countries).  The 
first has proven untrue because large numbers of jobs in developed countries are locally rooted. The second effect has 
failed to materialize in a number of cases, as the wave of migration unleashed by NAFTA illustrates. 
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foreign ones, threatening national cultures.3 Immigration, too, is criticized for its displacement effects on 
native workers, and for the social and cultural shifts that it engenders.4 As Timothy Hatton has noted, 
“Across a broad range of countries attitudes are on balance against both imports and immigration, and 
the same types of people are against imports as are against immigration.”5  
And yet, the domestic politics of most developed countries have eventually yielded to the opening of 
trade despite these distributional and cultural concerns, while continuing to pose an obstacle to the 
liberalization of labor migration on the same grounds. In the international arena, this split translates into 
the two contrasts I have noted. Developed countries emphatically support increased trade abroad, while 
advocating and adopting restrictions on immigration. And developed countries pursue negotiations over 
trade in bilateral, regional, and multilateral settings, while preferring unilateralism or limited forms of bilat-
eralism to govern migration. With the exception of the European Union, regionalism is reserved for a few 
accords on high-skilled labor migration; multilateralism is unknown.
I explain these divergences as follows. First, labor migration involves human beings, who behave dif-
ferently than goods. This behavioral difference elicits a different sort of reaction to their arrival, which 
in turn shapes a different set of domestic political forces and incentives. Second, developed nations 
perceive immigration as having a lower payoff than trade, in part because trade is largely a reciprocal 
process, while labor migration is mostly a one-way street. Both factors reduce the (perceived) economic 
gains from immigration and make immigration a more difficult political issue in developed countries. 
Finally, while wealthy nations cannot achieve free trade and protections for mobile capital without the 
cooperation of less-developed countries, they can in almost all cases fill their needs for labor migrants 
through unilateral action. Cooperation is only attractive when it brings destination countries more than 
they could achieve on their own.
3 For a critique of free trade’s cultural effects, see Maude Barlow, The Global Monoculture, EARTH ISLAND J., Autumn 
2001, at 32. For a critique of free trade’s impact on workers, see Byron Dorgan and Sherrod Brown, Op-Ed., How Free 
Trade Hurts, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2006, at A21.  
4 For an attack on immigration for its impact on culture, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE 
CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004); for a critique of immigration for its economic impact, see 
George J. Borjas, Globalization and Immigration, in GLOBALIZATION: WHAT’S NEW 77, 84, 86–90 (Michael Weinstein ed., 
2005); and for an attack that mixes both elements, see MARK KRIKORIAN, THE NEW CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION: 
BOTH LEGAL AND ILLEGAL (2008).
5 Greenaway and Nelson argue that in the United States, trade policy (seen as national and economic) is set via 
“group politics” while immigration policy (seen as local and social) is set via “democratic politics.”  Id. at 359 (cit-
ing D. Greenaway & D. Nelson, The Distinct Political Economies of Trade and Migration Policy Through the Window of 
Endogenous Policy Podels, in LABOR MOBILITY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 25 (Foders & Langhammer eds., 2006)). 
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Transnational Labor Citizenship 
80 Southern California Law Review 503 (2007)
I. Introduction
Over one million new immigrants arrive in the United States each year.1 This spring, Americans saw sev-
eral times that number pour into the streets, protesting proposed changes in U.S. immigration and guest 
work policies.2 As the signs they carried indicated, most migrants come to work, and it is in the work-
place that the impact of large numbers of newcomers is most keenly felt. For those who see both the 
free movement of people and the preservation of decent working conditions as essential to social justice, 
this presents a seemingly unresolvable dilemma. In a situation of massive inequality among countries, to 
prevent people from moving in search of work is to curtail their chance to build a decent life for them-
selves and their families. But from the perspective of workers in the country that receives them, the more 
immigrants, the more competition, and the worse work becomes. 
 
As an advocate for immigrant workers for over twenty years, I have often spoken from the heart of that 
dilemma.3 This Article proposes a way out. In it, I develop the idea of “transnational labor citizenship,” a 
new approach to structuring cross-border labor migration that draws on, but goes beyond, current theories 
of transnational political citizenship. Transnational labor citizenship reconceptualizes the relationship among 
the governments of immigrant sending and receiving countries, civil society labor institutions, such as 
unions and worker centers, and private actors. Inspired by recent efforts to organize workers as they move 
across borders, transnational labor citizenship would link permission to enter the United States in search 
of work to membership in cross-border worker organizations, rather than to the current requirement of a 
job offer from an employer. It would facilitate the enforcement of baseline labor rights and allow migrants 
to carry benefits and services with them as they move. Its goal, heretofore elusive, is to facilitate the free 
movement of people while preventing the erosion of working conditions in the countries that receive them. 
 
Labor organizations are central to this proposal. Historically, unions have been restrictionist in their 
approach to immigration, but today most unions in the United States welcome immigrants already present 
in the industries they organize, including the undocumented.4 While this Article applauds this pro-immigrant 
position, it argues that to move forward on the immigration question from a social justice perspective, and 
to succeed in their goal of improving working conditions, unions must refashion themselves so they can 
accommodate an ongoing influx of new migrants. Simultaneously, the United States must reconfigure its 
approach to labor migration so that it sees workers’ organizations as allies in the process. 
 
This Article offers the new concept of “labor citizenship” as a lens for understanding the challenges 
unions face in taking the leap to an open attitude toward the future flow of migrants. By labor citizenship 
1 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & ROBERTO SURO, RISE, PEAK, AND DECLINE: TRENDS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 1992–2004, 
at i–ii (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?Report ID=53.
2 Luis Andres Henao, After the Amnesty: 20 Years Later, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 13, 2006, at A3.
3 See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005) Jennifer 
Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social 
Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995); Jennifer Gordon, Immigrants Fight the Power—Worker Centers Are 
One Path to Labor Organizing and Political Participation, NATION, Jan. 3, 2000, at 16.
4 I use the term “undocumented” to refer to noncitizens with no legal immigration status because it avoids the pejora-
tive inherent in phrases like “illegal immigrant” or “illegal alien.” The word also highlights a fairly recent emphasis on 
documentation at the intersection of U.S. labor and immigration law. It was not until 1986, with the passage of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act and its employer sanctions provisions, that all job seekers in the United States 
were required to present “documents” proving their authorization to work before being hired.
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I mean the ways in which workers’ organizations create membership regimes, set and enforce rules for 
those who belong, and approach their goal of improving wages and working conditions. Labor citizen-
ship also encompasses the normative expectation of solidarity among workers and active participation by 
them in the democratic governance of their own institutions. 
 
Strikingly, aspects of labor citizenship implemented by unions in the United States parallel the conven-
tional national citizenship framework. Like countries, which apportion privileges based on national citi-
zenship, unions offer a special set of benefits to their members alone.5 At a minimum, union boundaries 
separate those eligible to claim the higher wages guaranteed by union contracts from those beyond the 
contract’s scope. In some organizing models, particularly in the building trades, there have been times 
when labor citizenship is treated as a limited commodity, denied to some workers in order to increase the 
share of those within the circle. This model echoes the way that nation-states circumscribe those who 
will be admitted to citizenship to facilitate the amassing and distribution of limited resources. As nations 
do, unions assert that this line drawing is normatively important, in addition to its instrumental value. 
From the union perspective, bounded citizenship aids in the development of democracy and solidarity 
within the union, and enhances the capacity of union members to realize full and equal citizenship out-
side the workplace as well. From the perspective of the nation-state, it is often said to be a precondition 
for the creation of community and the flourishing of democracy. 
 
In the past decade, much has been written about the ways that political participation, once seen as a 
single-state phenomenon, has transformed into a transnational experience under pressure from massive 
migration around the globe.6 Transnational scholarship describes immigrant remittances as the driving 
force behind many of these changes but is curiously silent on the conditions of the work that produces 
5 In this Article, I use the word “members” when referring to workers who are represented by a union. This should be quali-
fied. First, in states that have passed so-called “Right to Work” legislation, workers are released from the obligation to join or 
pay dues to the union that represents them. For a typical “Right to Work” Law, see IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 44-2003 (2003). 
In such states—currently numbering twenty-three—employees in a unionized workplace who do not wish to offer the union 
their financial support do not have to do so, although under the doctrinal duty of fair representation the union must always 
represent the interests of all workers in the bargaining unit. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944); 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Right-to-Work Laws and Constitutional Amendments in Effect as of January 1, 2007 with Year of 
Passage, http://www.dol.gov/esa/programs/whd/state/righttowork.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007). Furthermore, after the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, although unions in non-“Right to Work” states can negotiate “agency shop” or “union shop” 
contracts that require that all workers in the bargaining unit pay dues, it is illegal to require workers to formally affiliate as 
members with the unions that represent them. See, e.g., Int’l Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers 
Local 444, 311 N.L.R.B. 1031, 1041 (1993) (invalidating a clause in a collective bargaining agreement requiring all employ-
ees to become “members of the Union in good standing” because such a clause “fails to apprise employees of the lawful 
limits of their obligation” to the union and “would lead an employee unversed in labor law to believe that employees were 
obliged to join the Union and satisfy all of the requirements for membership as a condition of employment”). Thus, even in a 
“union shop” there may be workers represented by the union who are not technically members.
6 The literature on transnational citizenship is vast. Foundational works include TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATION: RACE, CLASS, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALISM RECONSIDERED (Nina Glick-Schiller 
et al. eds., 1992) and YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL 
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994). Linda Bosniak’s article, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
447 (2000), offers an empirical and theoretical exploration of whether citizenship is an inherently national project, or 
whether it can and should be expanded across national borders. Roger Waldinger, David Fitzgerald, and Jonathan Fox, 
among others, have recently offered critiques of the argument that transnational citizenship represents a meaningful 
shift in the citizenship paradigm. See Jonathan Fox, Unpacking “Transnational Citizenship,” 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
171 (2005); Roger Waldinger & David Fitzgerald, Transnationalism in Question, 109 AM. J. SOC. 1177 (2004). A recent 
volume of the N.Y.U. Law Review explores this phenomenon in detail including Anupam Chander’s useful taxonomy of 
the emerging institutions of transnational economic and political citizenship. Anupam Chander, Homeward Bound, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (2006).
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remittance income.7 Such scholars have also been reluctant to take the leap from description of trans- 
national activities to normative exploration of how the transnational framework might be reshaped so  
that it serves the ends of a more just labor and immigration system.8 In exploring the potential for trans-
national labor citizenship, this Article takes on both tasks. 
 
The same forces shifting the practice and structure of citizenship on the national level are also bearing 
down on unions. Yet the transnationalization of political citizenship emerging on the national level does 
not yet have a clear parallel in labor citizenship. I argue that unions’ legitimate concerns about the effect 
of an oversupply of workers on working conditions has hampered their ability to reshape labor citizen-
ship to respond effectively to ongoing immigration. To be sure, as of the late 1990s unions in the United 
States became much more open to organizing new immigrants, including the undocumented. And, in 
the context of the global movement of capital, a number of unions have initiated cross-border efforts to 
support workers and unions in other countries.9 But the core model of labor citizenship has remained 
reliant on efforts to curtail the number of workers entering the labor market. In bringing undocumented 
immigrants into the fold of labor citizenship, most unions did not forgo the idea of boundaries. They 
merely extended their borders to include a new group. The idea that the future flow of migrants remain 
outside the reach of labor citizenship—and that union borders must be defended against them, or they 
will undermine the viability of that citizenship—remains essential to the vision of much of the labor move-
ment today. And yet, new migrants continue to arrive.
It is the central contention of this Article that the hard-bordered model of labor citizenship is untenable in 
the face of an increasingly global market for labor. Instead, I ask how we might productively reconceive 
of the relationship between labor citizenship and nation-state citizenship in a context of ongoing labor 
migration. Could a different form of labor citizenship better achieve the norms that the concept embod-
ies? What approach to labor organization makes sense in a globally interconnected world, if the goal is to 
7 There are a few exceptions, including the work of David Fitzgerald and Lynn Stephen, who have explored the links 
between labor unions and transnational political behavior. See David Fitzgerald, Beyond “Transnationalism”: Mexican 
Hometown Politics at an American Labour Union, 27 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 228 (2004); Lynn Stephen, Mixtec 
Farmworkers in Oregon: Linking Labor and Ethnicity Through Farmworker Unions and Hometown Associations, in 
INDIGENOUS MEXICAN MIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 179 (Jonathan Fox & Gaspar Rivera-Salgado eds., 2004).
8 It is also important to challenge the idea that the shift from nationalism or transnationalism has been linear, universal, 
or complete. Borders are still tremendously important sites for the exercise of real and symbolic national power, as the 
2006 congressional mandate for the construction of a 700-mile wall along the southern U.S. border illustrates. Secure 
Fence Act of 2006, H.R. 6061, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006). Within the United States, the state’s capacity to exclude 
and deport immigrants increased over the course of the 1990s and 2000s. Changing laws drastically increased the 
facility with which legal permanent residents convicted of crimes could be stripped of their green cards, and ramped 
up surveillance and enforcement against those whose religion, ethnicity, or nationality placed them within the state’s 
rubric of “suspected terrorists.” See generally Muneer Ahmad, Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the Day After 
September 11, 20 SOC. TEXT 72 (2002); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); 
E-mail from Sameer M. Ashar, Assistant Professor, City University of New York School of Law, to author (Aug. 2, 2006) 
(on file with author) (“[T]he post-9/11 reinforcement of national borders and immigration enforcement and the 1996 
targeting of LPR’s with criminal convictions seem to suggest a tiered system in which some populations are allowed to 
transnationalize, while others are targeted and put outside of our national borders.”). In these ways, transnationalism is 
best understood as a phenomenon that is permitted for “desirable aliens” by some receiving country governments, but 
forbidden by them to a large swath of would-be migrants (some of whom nonetheless migrate or remain illegally, and 
create transnational forms of participation from the bottom up).
9 For a historical overview of labor’s cross-border efforts, see BEVERLY J. SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS’ 
MOVEMENTS AND GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870 (2003). Examples of concrete campaigns are set out in Terry Davis, 
Cross-border Organizing Comes Home: UE & FAT in Mexico & Milwaukee, 23 LAB. RES. REV. 23 (1995); Andrew 
Herod, Organizing Globally, Organizing Locally: Union Spatial Strategy in a Global Economy, in GLOBAL UNIONS? 
THEORY AND STRATEGIES OF ORGANIZED LABOUR IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 83 (Jeffrey Harrod & 
Robert O’Brien eds., 2002); Kenneth Zinn, Labor Solidarity in the New World Order: The UMWA Program in Columbia, 
23 LAB. RES. REV. 35 (1995).
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create good work—at a bare minimum, work that can support a family, does not endanger the worker’s 
health, and provides adequate time off for other pursuits—in this country no matter who the worker is?10 
 
In response, I call for a thought experiment in the transnationalization of labor citizenship. I propose 
an opening up of the fortress of labor and of the nation-state to accommodate a constant flow of new 
migrants through a model that would tie immigration status to membership in organizations of trans-
national workers rather than to a particular employer. These memberships would entitle migrants to 
services, benefits, and rights that cross borders just as the workers do. In exchange for the authorization 
to work that they would receive as members, migrant workers would commit to the core value of labor 
citizenship: solidarity with other workers in the United States, expressed as a commitment to refuse to 
work under conditions that violate the law or labor agreements. 
 
The premise behind this proposal is that in the face of enormous inequality between countries, immigra-
tion controls will not stop the movement of workers from the South to the North. But recognizing that 
migrants will continue to arrive in the United States regardless of our policy does not require abdicating 
wages and working conditions to employers who would set them as low as the market permits. Advocates 
have long stated that the government must actively enforce basic workplace standards in immigrant-
heavy workplaces to set a floor for all workers. Such a step is necessary but insufficient. The state does 
not have the political will, the staffing, or the mechanisms to enforce those laws consistently, and even 
if it did, the minimums are set too low to assure workers a decent standard of living. To engage the state 
more fully in enforcement, and to go beyond inadequate existing levels of protection, workers themselves 
must organize. Transnational labor citizenship would shift the enforcement of a floor on working condi-
tions from the arena of immigration policy in employer hands, where it currently lies, to the arena of labor 
solidarity in worker hands, where it belongs. In this way, I argue, we can create structures that respond 
at once to the desires of migrants for jobs and to the aspirations of labor citizenship to preserve decent 
working conditions in this country.
10 Despite the transnational focus of my proposal, the central concern of this Article remains addressing conditions of 
work within the United States.
16  SPOTLIGHT JOURNAL
 Bibliography
Book
SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (Belknap/Harvard University 
Press, 2005) 
Law Reviews 
People Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 104 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW (forthcoming 2010) 
Rethinking Work and Citizenship (with R.A. Lenhardt), 55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1161
(2008) 
The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law, and Social Change,
95 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 2133 (2007) 
Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 503
(2007); excerpts reprinted in LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE
(Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, et. al., 2009); GLOBAL ISSUES, LOCAL ARGUMENTS (June
Johnson, ed., 2009) 
Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives (with
R.A. Lenhardt), 75 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW 2493 (2007), excerpts reprinted in
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY (6th ed.) (Alexander
Aleinikoff, David Martin, Hiroshi Motomura, and Maryellen Fullerton, 2008) 
Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers’ Legal Strategy in the 1960s and
1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL
OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 1 (2005) 
We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project and the
Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW
REVIEW 407 (1995); excerpts reprinted in SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS,
COMMUNITIES AND LAW (Martha Mahoney, John Calmore, and Stephanie Wildman
eds. 2003) 
FORDHAM LAW  17
Book Chapters 
The Impact of a New Law on a Movement: The Case of the UFW and the California
Agricultural Labor Relations Act, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, eds, Stanford University Press, 2006) 
Let Them Vote, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
OF NEW AMERICANS (Owen Fiss, et. al., eds., Beacon Press, 1999) 
Policy Papers 
Towards Transnational Labor Citizenship: Restructuring Labor Migration to Reinforce
Workers Rights (University of California-Berkeley Law School, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, 
Ethnicity, and Diversity Policy Paper, January 2009) 
Conflict and Solidarity Between African American and Latino Immigrant Workers (with R.A. Lenhardt) 
(University of California-Berkeley Law School, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and 
Diversity Policy Paper, November 2007) 
Other Articles 
Workers Without Borders (Op-ed), NEW YORK TIMES (March 9, 2009) 
American Sweatshops, BOSTON REVIEW (Summer 2005) 
Organizing Low-Wage Immigrants, WORKINGUSA vol. 5 no. 1 (2001) 
Immigrants Fight the Power, THE NATION (January 3, 2000)

FORDHAM LAW  19
Leading Theory
During his five years at Fordham Law School, Professor Youngjae Lee has developed a large and impres-
sive body of work in criminal law theory. A Swarthmore College graduate with high honors in philosophy 
and economics, a Fulbright Scholar, and a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School with expe-
rience as an attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice, Professor Lee brings to his work an array of 
insights stemming and developing from his academic and practice backgrounds.
Lee’s theoretical work is closely tied to the criminal justice system’s condemnatory dimension. Lee has 
argued that, if the condemnation expressed by state punishment is to be persuasive, the state must 
speak with a credible voice, and in order to be credible the state’s statements about wrongness of 
criminal acts must reflect correct positions on questions of moral rights and wrongs. In other words, 
the state must operate the institution of punishment and calibrate its scale of punishment so that the 
punishments it imposes express the appropriate level of condemnation, given the seriousness of the 
offenses in question. His article “The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment” accordingly 
argues that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment should be read to 
prohibit the government from imposing punishments that exceed the correct level of condemnation. 
In his more recent work, Lee has focused on special problems that arise when proper evaluations of the 
culpability of offenders must make direct references to the moral significance of the state. In the case of 
core crimes, such as murder and rape, the task of thinking about what makes them wrongful, why it is 
that those who commit such offenses deserve to be punished, and how serious they are as crimes, seems 
manageable. Such core crimes can easily be imagined as pre-legal wrongs; murder, for instance, is wrong 
whether legal institutions exist or not. It is not as straightforward to evaluate crimes committed against the 
state, as understanding what makes offenses against the state wrongful necessitates an exploration of the 
justification of the existence and the scope of the power of the state and its various institutions. 
Two recent articles by Lee reflect on such themes. In “Recidivism as Omission,” for instance, Lee  
tackles the widespread intuition that repeat offenders are more blameworthy than first time offenders. 
Lee argues that we cannot understand the moral significance of reoffending until we come to grips 
with the way in which the nature of the relationship between an offender and the state changes at the 
moment of his or her conviction and punishment. In “The Defense of Necessity and Powers of the 
Government,” Lee weighs in on the torture debate and argues that it is a mistake to infer, from the exis-
tence of a potential necessity defense for the crime of torture in the so-called “ticking bomb” scenarios, 
a governmental power to engage in acts of torture in such situations. The necessity defense calls for an 
evaluation of a private individual acting in a situation of emergency in a way that takes into account the 
special status of the state as an exclusive wielder of instruments of violence, and such considerations do 
not apply in the same way when evaluating the state’s responses to emergency.
Youngjae Lee 
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Excerpts
Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account
87 Texas Law Review 571 (2009)
Are repeat offenders more culpable than first-time offenders? In the United States, the most important 
determinant of punishment for a crime, other than the seriousness of the crime itself, is criminal history. 
It is commonly, and casually, assumed that repeat offenders deserve more punishment than first-time 
offenders. However, desert theorists have been generally critical of sentencing enhancements based on 
the offender’s criminal history. While the belief that repeat offenders are deserving of greater punishment 
is widespread, there is no satisfactory retributivist defense of that prevailing view, prompting one leading 
scholar on the topic to note that “a plausible retributive justification for the recidivist sentencing premium 
has proved as elusive as the legendary resident of Loch Ness.”1 
One of the conceptual difficulties of the recidivist premium is that if we focus on the moment of offending, 
the offense does not look, at least at first, any different no matter who commits it—whether it was a repeat 
offender or a first-time offender. The first step out of this conundrum is to see that criminal offenses—like 
many acts that we undertake in life—do not happen in isolation. A series of events and circumstances 
can combine to produce a moment ripe for a crime to take place. This in turn means that well before indi-
viduals end up committing crimes, they can steer their lives in different directions in order to minimize the 
risk of finding themselves in a position in which committing a criminal offense becomes a compelling—or 
at least appealing—option.
One way to think about this is to divide up an individual’s life into different selves, as in the self at t0, the 
self at t1, at t2, t3, t4, and so on. What a past self does at t0 can powerfully shape the choices that the 
future self faces at, say, t4. To use a mundane example, a person on a diet might decide at t0 to travel 
out of the way to avoid passing next to a fast-food joint at t1. A person who has a tendency to overspend 
at grocery stores might eat at t0 to avoid grocery shopping at t1 on an empty stomach. Obviously, how 
one finds oneself in situations that tempt or induce one to commit a crime is a far more complicated 
matter. But a person who thinks that she has a tendency to give in to peer pressure to commit criminal 
acts may stay away from those who are likely to encourage her to engage in criminal activities. If a per-
son understands that having no source of income may lead him down the path of a life of a criminal, he 
could try to find a job to support himself and his family. If a person’s drug addiction leads her to look for 
quick bucks through burglary, then perhaps combating the drug addiction could lead to a life away from 
crime. If a person is tempted to molest children whenever he is around children, he can organize his life 
in a way that minimizes his contact with children. The point is that for every crime that a self commits 
at tx, we can find other “guilty” selves at tx−n preceding the self at tx who committed the crime. Loosely 
speaking, we might even say that one’s past self, through a series of missteps, can aid and abet a self in 
committing a crime by increasing the risk that the future self would commit that crime.
So what does this have to do with the recidivist premium? I am suggesting that the recidivist premium is not 
about what an offender does or reveals at the moment a crime is committed; rather, the recidivist premium 
is additional punishment directed at the previous selves who enabled the later self to commit a crime. The 
recidivist premium does not punish disobedience or bad character; rather, it punishes an ex-offender’s 
omission—the omission being his failure to take steps to prevent himself from committing another crime.
1 Julian V. Roberts, Punishing Persistence: Explaining the Enduring Appeal of the Recidivist Sentencing Premium, 48 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 468, 469 (2008).
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One may object, is it not the case that we demand that all persons—not just offenders—organize their 
lives so that they steer clear of criminality? Why is it not the case that when first-time offenders are being 
punished, they are being punished not only for committing the crimes with which they are charged, but 
also for their failures to live life in a way that would have allowed them to steer clear of criminality?
The answer is that there is a difference between a first-time offender and a repeat offender because a 
repeat offender has gone through the process of conviction and punishment and a first-time offender 
has not. When a person is convicted and punished for a crime, one thing we can say with confidence is 
that the relationship between that person and the state has changed in a way that makes that person dif-
ferent from others who have not had that kind of encounter with the state. It is this change in relationship 
that changes the normative positions of persons with regard to the state.
The idea that obligations arise from relationships is a familiar concept in law. The most straightforward 
relationship that can give rise to obligations in law is one created by a promise, but bases for obligations 
need not always be voluntary. For instance, family is often given as a paradigmatic example of an asso-
ciation that gives rise to obligations despite the fact that it is not—or at least not fully—voluntary. Even 
though phrases like “paying debt to one’s society” imply that once individuals have been punished, they 
start with a clean slate, the idea that punishment puts people back to where they were before flies in 
the face of our everyday experiences. One’s life cannot be thought of as simply one event after another, 
one encounter after another, each of which is discrete and disconnected from the others. “After all we 
have been through,” a phrase that typically precedes a normative statement, is not an idle phrase; it is 
a way of emphasizing the different normative expectations that arise as a result of what “we have been 
through.” What we expect of one another is shaped by what we have been through, and different rela-
tionships people enter into (voluntarily or involuntarily) can inject new, morally significant elements into 
their lives.
What kinds of morally significant duties or obligations exist as a result of the existence of a relationship 
depend on the nature of the relationship itself. The nature of the offender–state relationship is as follows. 
The institution of punishment has a communicative, expressive dimension. When the state punishes, it 
condemns what the offender has done as blameworthy and it communicates to the offender that what he 
has done is wrong. Implicit in that message, of course, is that the offender is being punished for what he 
has done, and after his punishment is complete, he shall not offend again.
Now, if the process of conviction and punishment communicates the message that what the offenders 
have done is wrong and they should not do it again, the process also should prompt a period of reflec-
tion on the part of offenders to determine how they ended up committing the prohibited act. This kind of 
self-diagnosis, aided by the institution of punishment, should identify what has gone wrong in an offend-
er’s life. People may end up committing crimes for different kinds of reasons, and those reasons differ 
for different types of offenses. Such diagnoses should lead to appropriate prescriptions for each offender, 
and each offender should follow those prescriptions while and after serving a sentence. A repeat offense 
by someone who has gone through this process of reflection, diagnosis, and prescription justifies the 
inference that, for whatever reason, the prescription was not followed, and the offender failed to prevent 
herself from reoffending by failing to organize her life in a way that steers clear of criminality.
Some may object that none of this is unique to repeat offenders. Those without criminal histories have 
the ability to know themselves and to understand the kinds of factors that lead people into situations in 
which they end up committing a crime. First-time offenders may have taken each step leading to their 
crimes knowing exactly what they were doing and understanding that each step was leading them clos-
er to the commission of a crime. Also, as mentioned above, those who are convicted of a crime for the 
first time are not necessarily those who have committed only one crime in their lives. Some may already 
22  SPOTLIGHT JOURNAL
have an impressive criminal background without ever having been caught. If my argument holds, and 
that those who are convicted of crimes know themselves well enough to know what kinds of things l 
ead them down the path of the criminal, then that argument should apply to those first-time offend-
ers who have good understandings of such factors as well. And if that is the case, then my argument 
ceases to become an argument in favor of singling out an offender’s criminal history as a significant 
aggravating factor.
However, this objection misses the point that the crucial difference between first-time offenders and 
repeat offenders is that the repeat offender has gone through a process with the state that has created a 
relationship with the state, and the point of that relationship was to ensure that whatever led the offender 
to the status of being a convict should be avoided in the future. It is that history of having had that rela-
tionship that first-time offenders lack. And once a person enters into a thick relationship with the state 
through the process of conviction and punishment, it is appropriate for the state to attribute blame to 
how a person has increased the risks of criminal wrongdoing over time.
The account advanced here opens up a new line of inquiry that, in my view, should always be part of 
the recidivist-premium calculus—the idea of assigning to the state at least partial blame for an offender’s 
recidivism. As I have been stressing, the engine that drives the recidivist premium is the relationship 
between the state and the offender, the point of which is to acknowledge that what the offender has 
done is wrong. And implicit in that relationship is a commitment on the part of the offender to organize 
his life in a way that steers clear of criminality so that he does not re-offend. Like most relationships, 
this is a relationship that places obligations on all parties involved. In the same way that the relationship 
between an offender and the state allows the state to take a closer look at how an offender carries out 
his life, the state also has a heightened responsibility towards the offender—namely, to help him get back 
to a life of normalcy or at least to not interfere with an offender’s effort to become a law-abiding citizen. 
In other words, if the recidivist premium is imposed for one’s failure to set his life straight postconviction, 
if what justifies the recidivist premium is the relationship between the individual and the state, and if the 
moral logic of the relationship necessitates the parties’ commitment that the offender should organize his 
life in order to prevent another offense, then it seems to follow that the state has a role to play in helping 
the offender live a life away from crime as well.
The Defense of Necessity and Powers of the Government
3 Criminal Law and Philosophy 133 (2009)
If one of the lessons of the ubiquitous and highly problematic “ticking bomb” scenario is that torture may 
be justified under certain narrowly specified situations, why would we not want it made available as a 
weapon in the government’s anti-terrorist activities? The question that this Essay addresses is related but 
narrower: if one starts from the proposition that the ticking bomb scenario demonstrates that a govern-
ment official facing prosecution for torture may have available the necessity defense, what implications, if 
any, should the government be able to draw from the existence of the defense as it formulates its torture 
policy? We have two well-known government documents that address this question.
First, in a much discussed opinion from 1999, the Supreme Court of Israel considered the question 
whether the General Security Service could legally engage in interrogation tactics that involved “physical 
means,” such as shaking, sleep deprivation, excessive tightening of handcuffs, and forcing subjects into 
uncomfortable positions. The Israeli Supreme Court handed down a pair of decisions that seem para-
doxical. The Court decided that if a GSS investigator is facing criminal prosecution, the necessity defense 
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would be available to him if all the requirements of the necessity defense are met. The Court also held, 
however, that generalizations about when the necessity defense may be available for the crime of torture 
may not be used as a way of authorizing government officials to torture in such situations.
Second, in the notorious “Torture Memo,” the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice 
addressed the questions as to the definition of “torture” under the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and what kinds of defenses would be available 
should a governmental official be found to have violated the convention, which is implemented in the 
United States as federal criminal provisions. The Bush administration relied on this memorandum when 
it devised interrogation practices used by the C.I.A. The Memo stated, among other things, that even 
if an interrogation method turns out to meet the definition of torture, the defense of necessity might be 
available to a government official facing prosecution for torture. Implicit in the Memo is the proposition 
that if one could raise a successful necessity defense in certain situations for the crime of torture, the 
government may design a program of interrogation in such a way that every governmental official facing a 
potential prosecution would have the necessity defense available to him or her.
The Israeli Supreme Court’s decision that the necessity defense cannot serve as a general basis to “infer 
authority to, in advance, establish permanent directives setting out the physical interrogation means 
that may be used under conditions of ‘necessity’” relied on an argument about the general nature of the 
necessity defense. The Court stated that the defense “is an ad hoc endeavor, in reaction to a event” and 
“a result of an improvisation given the unpredictable character events.” The Court concluded, “Thus, the 
very nature of the defence does not allow it to serve as the source of a general administrative power.”
The logic of this argument is not crystal clear. There are emergencies that are unforeseeable and the 
necessity defense may be well-suited for such situations, but there also are emergencies that are fore-
seeable and there are even emergencies that we can predict would recur over long periods of time. Every 
example of necessity given in textbook formulations deals with situations that can recur over time, such 
as “property may be destroyed to prevent the spread of fire,” “[a] speed limit may be violated in pursuing 
a suspected criminal,” “an ambulance may pass a traffic light,” and so on. It is unclear what is wrong 
or incoherent about devising general formulations that identify situations in which the necessity defense 
would be available. 
 
The truth of the matter lies elsewhere. We must start by asking what the necessity defense does. A typi-
cal way of thinking about criminal law defenses is to assume that the essence of the defenses mirrors 
moral principles. According to this view, contours of justification defenses should track morally permis-
sible instances of violations of prohibitions. If this view were taken seriously, then it does seem odd to 
recognize the necessity defense for certain instances of torture on one hand yet deny that the govern-
ment may engage in torture in similar situations. If moral and legal justifications coincide, then it follows 
that whatever is allowed by a (legal) justification defense is morally permissible, and the government may 
guide its own conduct by considering what conduct would constitute successful defenses since by doing 
so it would avoid engaging in immoral conduct.
The problem with this view is that the necessity defense is not available “if the issue of competing val-
ues has been previously foreclosed by a deliberate legislative choice, as when some provision of the 
law deals explicitly with the specific situation that presents the choice of evils or a legislative purpose to 
exclude the claimed justification otherwise appears.”1 That is, the defense does not contemplate princi-
ples of morality trumping legislative judgments in certain situations; it contemplates in fact the principle 
of legislative supremacy. Even if the optimal outcome in a given situation is to violate a given prohibition, 
1 Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 3.02 cmt. 2 at 13.
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if the legislature has chosen to mandate the suboptimal outcome in that situation, then the violation 
is not justified. The legislative will takes priority over dictates of morality when they conflict, and the 
necessity defense should be understood as a way of supplementing legislation, as opposed to a general 
all-purpose policy of not punishing individuals who do the right thing all things considered.
That the necessity defense is concerned not only with permitting illegal behavior when it is morally 
permissible but also with spelling out the terms of the relationship between citizens and the state can 
also be seen in the “imminence” or “emergency” requirement of the necessity defense. That is, it is not 
enough that a violation of the law resulted in a lesser evil than the evil avoided through the violation (and 
that it was not precluded by the legislature). The violation also must have been the only legal option that 
the actor had available to address the choice of evils he was facing. The point of the imminence require-
ment, then, is to allow violations of law only when the government is unavailable to prevent the harm that 
the actor seeks to avoid. The government is authorized to make decisions that harm individuals’ interests 
for the common good, and private individuals are prohibited from doing so, and the necessity defense 
allows private individuals to do the balance of evils calculation themselves and act on them in ways that 
hurt others’ interests only when the government is effectively out of the picture due to the imminence 
of harm. Of course, this does not mean that anything goes once the government is not available; there 
is still the requirement of choosing the lesser evil. The point, rather, is that when an individual may 
engage in this kind of balance of evils reasoning to guide his conduct in contemplating violating a law, as 
opposed to legal reasoning only, is severely constrained by the requirements of the necessity defense.
Why does the necessity defense have this particular structure? Once a law has prohibited a conduct, it 
demands compliance even if a citizen may have many good reasons not to comply in certain situations, 
and the law does that by “occupying” the field and replacing various reasons to engage or not engage 
in a conduct with the prohibition. The necessity defense lifts the prohibition, and the reasons for and 
against performing the act come roaring back in, and the law places strict limitations on when that pro-
hibition is lifted, by requiring that the danger be “imminent” and that legally sanctioned ways of dealing 
with that danger be unavailable due to the emergency nature of the situation. In other words, at least 
to the extent that the necessity defense restricts the ways in which private citizens may use force that 
harms another’s interest, the limited scope of the necessity defense is one of many tools that help sus-
tain the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence.
So, is there anything wrong with an argument that starts from the premise that the necessity defense 
may be available against prosecution for torture to the conclusion that the government can determine 
when torture is or is not allowed at least partly on the basis of the availability of the necessity defense? 
If the necessity defense is about allocating power between individuals and the state and is a way of sus-
taining the state monopoly on violence, then the argument in question amounts to a sleight of hand. The 
necessity defense is an exception to the general rule that only the state may act in certain ways; it cre-
ates a space in which citizens are empowered to act as if the state has disappeared from the scene, and 
it is improper for the state to refer to the existence of that space to expand the scope of its own power. 
The necessity defense effects a division of power, with the state reserving itself the power to harm indi-
viduals’ interests as a general matter but letting individuals have such powers in situations of emergency. 
The necessity defense, in other words, exists to empower individuals where individuals are supposed to 
be powerless; it cannot be used to confer powers on the state as well.
One might object to this conclusion. If it is indeed the case, the objection might go, that an individual is 
empowered to act as if he is a government official in situations of emergency, does it not follow then that 
a government official is also able to act in the way that a private individual is allowed to act in such situa-
tions? That is, how can one start with the presumption of state monopoly on violence and argue that the 
state monopoly is sometimes shared with private individuals and conclude that a state cannot do what a 
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private individual is allowed to do? If a private individual can do something only when he is allowed to act 
as if he is a state actor, then a fortiori, a government official can do it in the same situation. Therefore, 
the argument would conclude, it is entirely appropriate for a government body to examine what is allowed 
under the necessity defense and seek guidance as to what it is allowed to do. After all, the government’s 
power is greater than what is allowed to private individuals under the necessity defense, and the greater 
(state’s monopoly on violence) must necessarily include the lesser (individual’s use of violence).
The problem with this argument is its conflation of the domain of governmental power with authorized 
uses of governmental power. The state monopoly on violence is a statement about the domain of govern-
mental power in relation to its citizens. The monopoly prohibits everyone other than the state to use vio-
lence, but that of course does not mean that any use of violence by the state is legitimate. For instance, 
only the state may punish, but the power of the state to punish is strictly regulated as to whom, when, 
how, and how much it may punish. Neither does the state monopoly on violence mean that a private 
individual’s authorized use of violence necessarily has a governmental counterpart every time. All that the 
necessity defense does is to lift the prohibition on private uses of violence thereby creating a domain in 
which individuals are empowered to use violence, temporarily weakening the monopoly, but such a lifting 
of prohibition does not create a corresponding power for the state. 
The confusion of domain and authorized uses of governmental power can easily arise in discussions of the 
necessity defense because the common examples used to illustrate the nature of the necessity defense 
involve situations in which the prohibited yet justified conduct by the individual is something that public offi-
cials are permitted to engage in as routine parts of their job (such as running a red light). The discussions 
encourage the perception that what an individual is doing is the job that a government official normally 
does or that an individual is doing what a government official or the legislature would allow him to do if they 
were around to give permission during situations of emergency (say, permission to run a red light). But that 
perception is wrong. What is allowed to happen during the suspension of the state monopoly on violence 
has no implications for how the state is allowed to act within its own domain. What the state is allowed or 
not allowed to do is determined by a whole another set of power-conferring rules, such as the Constitution, 
legislations, and regulations. This is why it is improper for the state to proceed from the proposition that the 
necessity defense allows individuals to act in certain ways in situations of emergency to the conclusion that 
government officials are therefore allowed to act in the same way. 
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Rethinking Race and Equality
The persistence of racial inequality in the United States has long been a concern of legal scholars. 
Critical race scholars, in particular, have interrogated the role of legal norms in perpetuating racial 
inequalities across a variety of social contexts and have proposed alternative jurisprudential frameworks 
for addressing these inequalities. In a fairly crowded field of impressive scholars, Professor Robin A. 
Lenhardt has emerged as a rising star among second-generation critical race theorists. 
Her groundbreaking article, “Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma and Equality in Context,” provides 
a disciplined and systematic analysis of racial harm as a basis for moving courts beyond their highly 
formalistic approach to questions of racial equality. Canvassing social science literature and the history of 
equal protection jurisprudence, Professor Lenhardt proposes that courts consider the stigmatic impact of 
laws and policies in determining their constitutionality. This multidisciplinary approach to stigmatic racial 
harm is characteristic of her body of scholarship dedicated to creating a thicker, more comprehensive 
conception of equality to effectively address the harms of racism. 
The lens through which Professor Lenhardt examines questions of racial equality grows, in part, out of 
her professional experience. She joined the Fordham Law faculty in 2004 after spending two years at 
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, where her work included serving as part of the litigation team defending the 
University of Michigan in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger, two affirmative action cases decided 
by the Supreme Court in 2003. She has also worked as an attorney advisor at the U.S. Department of 
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, a Skadden Fellow at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, and a law 
clerk to Justice Stephen G. Breyer of the Supreme Court. While studying for her LL.M. at Georgetown 
Law Center, she served as a Future Law Professor Fellow. Her teaching career began as a Visiting 
Professor at the University of Chicago. She received her J.D. from Harvard and her A.B. from Brown. 
Professor Lenhardt’s identification of racial stigmatization as a form of inequality provides an important 
foundation for her later work identifying exclusion from one’s community as an element of racial stig-
matization. She advances, for example, the idea of “belonging” as a way to understand the citizenship 
dimensions of marriage vis-à-vis exclusion on the basis of race and sexual orientation. In a recent article, 
she analyzes the relevance of Perez v. California, a landmark antimiscegenation case decided in 1948 by 
the California Supreme Court, to constitutional questions regarding same-sex marriage. Lenhardt locates 
in Justice Roger Traynor’s opinion an articulation of the citizenship dimension of marriage: the ability to 
choose your marital partner. This citizenship dimension of marriage, she argues, opens up a space where 
questions of racial and gender exclusion from marriage are deeply and conceptually linked. This powerful 
rethinking of marriage, citizenship, and belonging offers a more substantive idea of equality for courts to 
embrace in approaching contemporary questions of marriage equality.
Robin A. Lenhardt
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Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight  
for Same-Sex Marriage
96 California Law Review 839 (2008)
Sixty-five years ago, two California factory workers, Sylvester Davis and Andrea Pérez, committed an act 
that would transform the terrain of race and ethnicity in the United States. They fell in love. Determined 
to share the rest of their lives together, Sylvester, an African American just returning from service abroad 
in World War II, and Andrea, the daughter of Mexican immigrants, went to the Los Angeles county clerk 
several years later to obtain a marriage license. The county clerk, however, refused to grant them one. 
Sylvester and Andrea had run afoul of California’s antimiscegenation law. 
On its face, this antimiscegenation law, which had been in effect from California’s entry into the union 
in 1850, did not appear to apply to Sylvester and Andrea. It declared that “marriages of white persons 
with negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or mulattoes” would be deemed illegal and 
void. Individuals of Mexican descent were nowhere mentioned in the statute. But, in California, Mexican 
Americans had long been regarded as white for purposes of marriage. Andrea was a mestizo who, by 
all accounts, did not appear phenotypically white and who, given the racial politics of California at the 
time, likely received none of the social privileges associated with whiteness. Ironically, though, she was 
deemed to fall among those whose blood had to be protected from contamination by non-Whites. 
Devout Catholics interested in marrying in their neighborhood church, Sylvester and Andrea refused to 
resort to the strategies employed by other couples ensnared in the bramble bush of California’s race reg-
ulations. They were unwilling to cohabitate, misrepresent their racial identity, or even to seek a marriage 
license in a sister-state without an antimiscegenation law, as many others did. They sought legal marriage 
on the same terms available to all Californians. And so, with the help of a civil rights attorney named Dan 
Marshall, they resolved to challenge California’s antimiscegenation law.
This decision was significant, but not monumental in and of itself. Litigants had made various challenges 
to the application of antimiscegenation laws over the years. Relatively few, however, had sought to chal-
lenge the entire antimiscegenation apparatus. Andrea and Sylvester undertook this challenge and won. 
On October 1, 1948, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion holding the state’s antimiscegena-
tion law unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Its ground-breaking 
decision, which marked the first time since Reconstruction that any antimiscegenation statute had 
been invalidated, led to significant changes in the lives of interracial couples in California. But outside 
California, other state courts rarely relied on or even cited it. Indeed, for years, a footnote mention in the 
Supreme Court’s Loving v. Virginia decision was Perez’s greatest claim to fame. 
But for the efforts of advocates in recent litigation to secure civil marriage rights for same-sex couples, 
Perez would have been consigned to legal obscurity. Advocates for same-sex marriage have been “lov-
ing” Perez. In cases such as In re Marriage Cases, in which the California Supreme Court recently held 
that “the failure to designate the official [domestic partnership] relationship of same-sex couples as mar-
riage violates the California Constitution,” advocates have treated Perez as a landmark case that sheds 
light on the core meaning of marriage, perhaps even more so than Loving itself. Opponents of full mar-
riage rights for members of the LGBT community frequently attack this deployment of Perez and other 
similar cases, insisting that it distorts precedents that, at bottom, concern issues of race alone. In this 
article, I argue that this assertion could not be more wrong.
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Far from distorting the meaning of Loving and other cases, the use of Perez in recent litigation helps 
to focus attention on the problems inherent in identity-based marriage restrictions in a way that Loving 
failed to do. Loving identifies marriage as one of the “basic civil rights of man,” but focuses principally on 
the white supremacist subtext of the antimiscegenation laws. Perez, in contrast, both engages issues of 
race and its social construction through such law, and develops a more fulsome account of the marriage 
rights with which interracial marriage bans interfered. It makes clear that the fundamental right to marry 
involves the freedom to marry not just anyone, but the “person of [one’s] choice.” In this sense, Perez, 
with its emphasis on choice and self-expression, goes beyond the more limited articulation of marriage 
rights that appears in the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving.
In addition, advocates’ utilization of Perez in recent cases helps to highlight the often overlooked 
fact that antimiscegenation laws served to shape societal norms regarding gender, as well as race. 
To be sure, interracial marriage bans worked to define the borders of racial identity and race. By 
now, the mechanisms employed by states in defining who, for example, was “white” or “black” for 
the purposes of antimiscegenation statutes are legend. But it is also true that, for those laws, race 
and gender were inextricably tied. Historians have for some time focused on the race and gender 
dimensions of antimiscegenation laws. Legal scholars have also begun to consider in important ways 
the intersecting identities regulated by such provisions. The strategic embrace of Perez in the marriage 
cases underscores this connection and, in doing so, promises to advance understanding about 
antimiscegenation laws, as well as restrictions on marriage for gay and lesbian couples.
Finally, by unearthing Perez and injecting it into both legal and public conversations about modern mar-
riage, advocates have provided us with a path out of the “analogy debate” so often a part of discussions 
about the rights of gay men and lesbians to marry. Perez gives us an opportunity to interrogate not just 
the similarities or differences in the experiences of groups that have historically had limitations placed on 
their right to marry, but also the fundamental nature of the right to marry and the substantive effects of 
state marriage regulations. I argue that, by restricting intimate choice, identity-based restrictions on civil 
marriage improperly limit self-definition efforts, cabin expressions of human identity and intimacy, and 
have a negative impact on the ability of those affected to “belong” as full members of the citizenry or 
broader community in which they reside. 
Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Inequality in Context
79 New York University Law Review 803 (2004)
[This article makes] the case for understanding racial stigma and the negative meanings and effects 
associated with it as the principal source of racial injury and disadvantage in the United States. We know 
now what social scientists say about how [racial stigma] operates and the nature of the harms it imposes, 
especially those related to citizenship and the exclusion of African Americans and other minorities from the 
conversations, interactions, and relationships necessary for meaningful democratic engagement. This Part 
tries to develop an understanding of how courts have historically addressed the issue of racial stigma. More 
specifically, it looks at the U.S. Supreme Court and its treatment of the problem of racial stigma over time.
For many people, the Supreme Court’s history with issues of racial stigma starts in 1954 with its cele- 
brated decision in Brown or, perhaps, with its affirmative action cases, which have debated the stigmatic 
effects of race-conscious programs designed to remedy past discrimination or enhance diversity for 
decades. But, as Justice Taney’s discussion in Dred Scott and his stigma-based conclusion that Blacks 
“are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution” 
suggests, the Supreme Court was forced to contemplate the legal consequences of racial stigmatization 
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long before Brown and the affirmative action cases arose. Indeed, a close look at Supreme Court cases in 
this area makes clear that a concern about the effects of racial stigma runs throughout the Court’s mod-
ern cases. In the years since the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, the Court has plainly concluded 
that the harms imposed by racial stigma lie at the core of the problems of inequality the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to address. 
This understanding about the significance of racial stigma in the constitutional scheme did not, of 
course, emerge immediately. In the decades just after the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment, the 
Court’s position on the seriousness of the threat that racial stigma posed to equality varied significantly. 
Strauder v. West Virginia provides an example of an instance in which the Court recognized the 
citizenship harms associated with racial stigma. In that case, the Court was asked to assess the 
constitutionality of a West Virginia statute excluding Blacks from jury service. Taking the view that the 
Fourteenth Amendment encompassed an affirmative right to be free from racial stigma and “unfriendly 
legislation . . . implying inferiority in civil society,” the Court held that the statute, among other things, 
impermissibly stigmatized those excluded from jury service on the grounds of race.
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to 
participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are 
citizens . . . is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, 
and . . . an impediment to securing [equal protection] to individuals of the race. 
Plessy v. Ferguson, in contrast, found the Court unsympathetic to claims of racial stigmatization. Indeed, 
the Court seemed to say that racial stigmatization, to some extent, was a “just and necessary” aspect 
of black life. Perhaps because social, rather than political, rights—such as voting or jury service—were 
at issue, the Court’s view was that “a statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white 
and colored races” raised no real citizenship concerns. For Justice Brown, who authored the Court’s 
opinion, citizenship referred to formal or political citizenship alone, not the broader notions of citizenship 
discussed in Part I. If African Americans experienced exclusion from railway cars as a “badge . . . of 
inferiority” prohibiting them from full citizenship, he asserted, “it is not by reason of anything found in the 
act,” but because “the colored race . . . put[s] that construction” on it. 
It would take more than fifty years for the Court to clarify its position on racial stigma’s significance as a 
constitutional concept or principle. The Court accomplished this with its 1954 decision in Brown, which 
overturned Plessy. By invalidating segregated public schools as unconstitutional, the Court seemed to 
embrace fully the notion that racial stigma—whether it impairs social or political rights—constitutes one 
of the harms the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to address. Taking a page from Strauder, the 
Court recognized racial stigma as a problem linked directly to citizenship and the guarantee of equal 
protection, arguing that education provides “the very foundation of good citizenship” and that its denial 
on racial grounds would marginalize African-American children in the larger society. “In these days,” 
the Court asserted, “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education.” 
In addition to focusing on issues of citizenship, the Brown Court concerned itself with the psychological 
aspect of the harms imposed by racial stigma. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) legal team that brought the consolidated cases in Brown introduced extensive social 
science evidence at trial and in their briefs before the Court on the racially stigmatizing and psychological 
effects of forced segregation, including submissiveness, diminished personal drive, and overall “feelings 
of inferiority.” Professor Kenneth Clark’s doll test, which sought to measure the psychological impact 
of racial stigma by recording childrens’ responses to black and white dolls, was the centerpiece of this 
evidence. Clark reported that the African-American children tested expressed preferences for white dolls; 
FORDHAM LAW  33
moreover, they most often ascribed negative attributes to the black dolls, leading Clark to conclude that 
the children had internalized, to their detriment, the negative identity norms so important to maintaining 
Jim Crow segregation. 
On the strength of this and other research, the Court held that the stigmatizing effects of segregation also 
had an impermissible psychological impact. This portion of the Court’s opinion was drafted in particularly 
strong terms. “To separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of 
their race,” Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court, “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in 
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” The Court’s 
view was that the injuries flowing from racial stigma were permanent, largely because the segregation 
was state-sanctioned. 
The Brown Court’s focus on issues relating to racial stigma arguably helped put an end to the kind of 
uncertainty about the constitutional significance of racial stigma that existed in the wake of Strauder and 
Plessy. Today, the Court’s equal protection cases are replete with cautionary references to the racially stig-
matizing effects of discriminatory policies. And the idea that the Constitution reflects anti-stigma notions 
has been widely accepted. Ironically, though, a precise understanding of racial stigma and the harms it 
imposes has remained elusive. The Court—despite its reliance on social science evidence in Brown—has 
yet to bring its understanding of racial stigma in sync with what social science research currently says 
about how racial stigma operates. In fact, it has yet to define racial stigma with any specificity at all.
The definition of racial stigma employed at any given time seems to change by case and individual 
justice. In education cases following Brown, we see racial stigma being defined as a citizenship-like 
harm, a matter of psychological harm, or both. But the definition employed often shifts when the Court 
considers cases in other areas. Consider, for example, the Court’s decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., which addressed the constitutionality of a 1983 Richmond program designed to increase 
the number of racial minorities in the construction industry by requiring prime contractors awarded 
municipal contracts to subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar amount of any contract to one or 
more minority business enterprises (MBEs). 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, concluded that the strict scrutiny standard Justice Powell had 
applied eleven years earlier in articulating the judgment in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
should apply, rather than the more lenient intermediate standard that had been applied to a federal MBE 
program in Fullilove v. Klutznick. In explaining the need for such an exacting standard, Justice O’Connor 
invoked racial stigma: “Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are 
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a 
politics of racial hostility.” 
The use to which Justice O’Connor put the term “stigmatic harm,” however, differs from what we have seen 
in the other cases discussed thus far. The utilization of the term “racial inferiority” in conjunction with a 
statement Justice Powell made in the admissions context—where implementation of affirmative action has, 
as the narrative in Part II suggests, raised old questions about the intellectual capabilities of minorities—
suggests that it refers here to some intellectual infirmity or lack of overall ability, not the citizenship-based 
notion of stigma so prominent in Strauder or the psychological harm featured in Brown. At the same time, 
the notion that stigmatic harm could be imposed by a mere classification, as opposed to, say, one expressly 
designed to disadvantage, suggests that yet another conception of stigma was in play: the notion of racial 
otherness, the idea that being recognized as racially different by government—whether or not one belongs 
to a racial group with a history of discriminatory treatment—is its own type of stigma. 
Shaw v. Reno conceptualized racial stigma in yet another way. That case involved a North Carolina redis-
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tricting plan drawn to include two majority-minority voting districts. Marking a dramatic turn from its earlier 
voting rights precedents, the Court held that white voters could assert an equal protection claim challeng-
ing the two oddly misshapen districts as unconstitutional and impermissibly drawn for the sole purpose of 
electing African Americans to Congress, even though they asserted no claim of vote dilution or interference 
with their ability to vote. To reach this conclusion, the Court drew on the concept of racial stigma, in terms 
similar to those employed in Croson: “Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race . . . ‘threaten to 
stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility.”’ 
When it lamented that North Carolina’s two districts—because they were drawn to enhance minority 
voting strength—sent the message that “members of the same racial group . . . think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates[,]” the Court seemed poised to draw on a 
citizenship, psychological, or inferiority-based notion of stigmatic harm. But the danger of what it called 
“political apartheid” was only a piece of what motivated the Court. In the end, it was not the concern 
that white voters would be stigmatized as racially similar to Blacks, but the idea that they might suffer 
stigma as a result of not being recognized as racially distinct from them—a kind of courtesy stigma—that 
seemed most to concern the majority. Essentially, the Court cast racial stigma as a “reputational” type of 
harm, which helps explain Justice O’Connor’s assertion that the redistricting plan risked telling “elected 
officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole.” 
For all the definitions of racial stigma—inferiority or citizenship, psychological, or reputational-based—that 
it has employed, the Court often fails to recognize racially stigmatic harm when it is present. Board of 
Education v. Dowell, a case involving a challenge to the dissolution of an Oklahoma desegregation decree, 
provides one illustration of this problem. Palmer v. Thompson, which involved Jackson, Mississippi’s deci-
sion to close its swimming pools rather than integrate and open them to Blacks, as it had done with other 
public facilities, offers another. In Palmer, the majority declined even to consider seriously the possibility 
that the closings might send a negative expressive message about Jackson’s African-American residents. It 
rejected out of hand claims that the closings stigmatized African-American residents as unfit for member-
ship in the larger community and concluded that Jackson’s actions did not deny equal protection. 
A number of factors account for this failure to recognize racial stigma and for the definitional variations 
discussed earlier. To begin, the Court has a very narrow understanding of both the sources of racial 
stigma and the harms it imposes. Part I of this Article primarily located racial stigma as a problem 
of social meaning and norms, one that affects our unconscious, cognitive processes and responses 
to race and imposes harms ranging from racial microaggressions to persistent racial disadvantage in 
areas such as employment, education, and health care, among other things. In contrast, the Court 
repeatedly casts racial stigma as a problem of intentional discrimination alone. Along with the depriva-
tion of concrete benefits such as employment opportunities or access to schools, racial stigma is seen 
by the Court as one of the harms of intentional discrimination, not one of its causes. By intentional 
discrimination, however, the Court does not necessarily mean overtly discriminatory acts of the sort 
discussed in Part II. 
Under the Court’s cases, the mere consideration of race as a factor in government decisionmaking can, 
in certain circumstances, result in racial stigma. Shaw v. Reno, a case in which the plaintiffs alleged 
no deprivation of any right whatsoever, is perhaps the strongest evidence of this. Racial stigma, for the 
Court, has become a sort of reputational harm, one that can arise by the mere acknowledgement (or fail-
ure to acknowledge) of racial difference. This superficial understanding comports with the very narrow, 
formalistic interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and the notion of equality the Court has adopted 
in its race cases in the last two or three decades, but it is, as we have seen, very much out of sync with 
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current sociological views on the problem of racial stigma and the very substantive citizenship effects—
social, economic, and political—that it can have on stigmatized individuals. 
Additionally, the Court has no consistent, structured mechanism for analyzing cases involving a risk of 
racial stigmatization. Indeed, although the Court has often regarded racial stigma as a problem of consti-
tutional dimensions, it is difficult to predict when or how the Court will deem it necessary even to men-
tion the potentially stigmatizing effects of a challenged policy or action. This, admittedly, is not so much a 
direct conflict with social science as it is a consequence of ignoring some of its core teachings about how 
racial stigma operates. As I indicated earlier, the social science insight that racial stigma is very much 
mediated by context and the historical realities of race in the United States provides a clue as to how to 
approach the task of assessing the risk of racially stigmatic harm. One must, at a minimum, be focused 
on the historical context out of which an allegedly stigmatizing program or policy stems, if racial stigma is 
ever to be effectively addressed.
The Court, however, has not demonstrated that it can reliably be expected to engage in such contextualiza-
tions. We can, of course, point to some instances in which the Court has tried to place its decisions within a 
broader context that would allow for interpretation of stigmatic meaning. In Brown, for example, the Court’s 
conclusions were based, in part, on its broad interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purposes and 
an understanding of the important role that education had come to play in the development of future citi-
zens. An expansive view of context also made it possible to interpret stigmatic meaning in Strauder.
There, the Court looked to examples of discriminatory laws in effect at the time, as Justice Taney did in 
Plessy, but also endeavored to understand the overall context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted. “The true spirit and meaning of the [civil rights] amendments,” Justice Strong, the author of the 
majority opinion in Strauder, admonished, “cannot be understood without keeping in view the history of 
the times when they were adopted, and the general objects they plainly sought to accomplish.” 
But the deliberate consideration of context seems to have been jettisoned in later cases. Consider Shaw 
v. Reno, where, in recognizing a voting rights claim for the white plaintiffs, the Court imputed a history of 
discrimination and deprivation to Whites without any hesitation, much less evidence of actual harm, despite 
the fact that evidence of harm in the voting rights context pertained primarily to African Americans. One 
can also look to cases such as Palmer or Dowell, where decisions about the actuality or risk of stigmatiza-
tion were essentially made in a vacuum, without any inquiry into past and future contexts. 
In far too many cases, the analysis employed by the Court has been ahistorical and willfully ignorant of 
relevant contexts, and, thus, necessarily incomplete. Essentially, the Court has no principled way for eval-
uating a potentially stigmatizing program or, for that matter, for deciding between two options that each 
run a risk of stigma. Were it not for the seriousness of the harms that racial stigma imposes, the Court’s 
narrow approach and refusal to take into account social science in this area arguably would not be cause 
for concern, much less the subject of an Article. But we know from Part II that refusing to attend to the 
problem of racial stigma has real consequences—individual and collective—for the people it affects.
In failing to adopt a consistent approach to racial stigma, the Court, in a very real sense, becomes com-
plicit in its perpetuation. If the Court is to fulfill its mandate in Fourteenth Amendment cases, it must 
develop a strategy to address the full range of racially stigmatic harms—those that arise from intentionally 
discriminatory acts as well as those that are imposed unconsciously or as a result of cognitive processes 
of which individuals are not necessarily aware. What is required, in sum, is a more comprehensive 
approach to identifying and remedying racial stigma than has heretofore been suggested in the Court’s 
cases or in legal scholarship.
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The Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship
Legal scholarship has undergone a tremendous methodological transformation over the last decade. The 
growth of computing power and wide availability of sophisticated statistical software have emboldened 
many legal scholars to undertake rigorous empirical research. Even as they approach legal disputes and 
policy questions with careful data collection and thorough statistical analysis, scholars are increasingly 
faced with questions about the ability of empirical methodology to answer important normative legal 
questions.
Professor John Pfaff is at the forefront of this revolution in legal scholarship and, paradoxically, one of its 
strongest critics. With a law degree and Ph.D. in economics from the University of Chicago, Pfaff is well 
situated to examine the interplay of legal theory and social science research. 
Pfaff’s scholarship poses and meticulously examines empirical questions at the heart of the robust legal 
and policy debates concerning criminal sentencing and incarceration. His work on incarceration has 
focused on explaining how the U.S. prison population has quintupled since the 1970s, both by exposing 
the systematic methodological shortcomings of earlier empirical work and by developing new models to 
elucidate these issues. Committed to improving the way that empirical evidence is used in these debates, 
Pfaff has focused on identifying and distinguishing methodologically sound statistical studies and finding 
ways to mitigate problems arising from the legal system’s reliance on “dueling experts.” For his work on 
the latter topic, Professor Pfaff earned a two-year grant from the John Templeton Foundation and the 
University of Chicago’s Arete Initiative for the study of wisdom.
Pfaff’s early work examined whether voluntary sentencing guidelines could yield sentencing outcomes 
as consistent as those brought about by mandatory guidelines, a question of significant importance after 
the Supreme Court’s Blakely v. Washington opinion declared mandatory guidelines unconstitutional. Pfaff 
demonstrated that voluntary guidelines, while perhaps not as effective, can serve as viable alternatives. 
Pfaff then turned his attention to the broader question of empirically evaluating factors (including sen-
tencing guidelines) that contributed to the striking surge in U.S. incarceration rates over the past three 
decades. He found that many empirical models devised to determine the cause of the prison population 
explosion were methodologically flawed.  
In his own empirical studies, Pfaff has demonstrated that the rise in prison populations came, primarily, 
through admissions to prisons—i.e., the willingness to incarcerate increasingly minor offenders in the first 
place—and not from length of time served. He is now interested in devising better measures of the forces 
that shaped admissions during the prison boom. 
His concerns with methodological problems in criminology have led Pfaff to examine ways to improve 
how the social sciences, in general, produce empirical knowledge. He posits that stunning advances in 
computer technology over the past several decades have enabled a dramatic increase in the volume, but 
not always the quality, of empirical work. Pfaff argues that the social sciences, like the fields of medicine 
and epidemiology, must develop rigorous quality assessment tools for evaluating empirical research. 
Pfaff’s scholarly activity centers on developing tools to address the specific needs of social scientists. 
Pfaff argues that such tools could significantly improve how empirical conclusions are made in the law. 
John Pfaff 
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Excerpts
A Plea for More Aggregation: The Looming Threat to Empirical Legal 
Scholarship*
Work in Progress
The empirical social sciences, including empirical legal scholarship (ELS), stand at a critical threshold. 
A technological revolution over the past three decades has led to a tremendous boom in the production 
and use of empirical work, thanks to staggering advances in computing power and storage. But 
this boom has also exposed deep problems in the traditional methods empiricists use to produce 
knowledge; though perhaps always present, these problems are now unavoidable thanks to the surging 
volume of empirical analysis. As a result, in some empirical disciplines—particularly medicine and 
epidemiology—the technological revolution has inspired a parallel philosophical revolution, namely 
the Evidence Based Policy (EBP) movement. At one level, EBP appears to focus simply on developing 
more rigorous techniques for synthesizing knowledge from a growing (and often contradictory) body of 
studies. But at a deeper level it reflects a new, and substantially superior, philosophy of science for the 
biological and social sciences. 
Unfortunately, while taking full advantage of the technological revolution, the social sciences have almost 
completely overlooked the need for the philosophical revolution: the concerns raised by EBP’s propo-
nents are often unheard, and the solutions they have proposed generally ignored. This is dangerous, par-
ticularly for the law. The growth in empirical analysis has increased the volume of contradictory claims. 
Some of the disagreement is surely due to just the general noisiness of statistical results, but by lowering 
the costs of producing empirical work, the technological revolution has made it easier for partisans to 
cynically produce skewed studies and for unskilled analysts to naively produce erroneous results.1 At 
times, a corollary of Newton’s Third Law appears to hold: for every empirical claim there is an opposite 
(though by no means necessarily equal) claim. And current practices in the social sciences, shaped by a 
misguided philosophy of science, are poorly equipped to sort through the disagreeing voices. 
The dangers that such a cacophony pose for litigation and regulation, and policymaking more gener-
ally, are clear. In recent years the law has embraced empirical analysis, with more scholars undertaking 
rigorous empirical projects, more non-empiricists wrestling with the implications of empirical findings, 
and more legal disputes invoking empirical evidence. But without some means of differentiating the good 
studies from the bad, and of obtaining a holistic understanding of what the good results imply, empirical 
disciplines—both within and outside the law—will be incapable of providing meaningful guidance. And 
should this happen, legal actors will be forced to rely less on a rigorous understanding of how the world 
works and more on mere guesswork or, even worse, self-satisfying assumptions.2
* My thanks to Steven Goodman, Susan Haack, Daniel Ho, Mark Patterson, Charlie Poole, Barney Reeves, Donald 
Rubin, and Aaron Saiger for many helpful comments and discussions. Funding from the University of Chicago’s Arête 
Initiative and the John Templeton Foundation’s Defining Wisdom Project is gratefully acknowledged. The views in this 
paper do not necessarily reflect those of the University of Chicago or the John Templeton Foundation. All errors are 
my own. 
1 Michaels (2008) and Taverne (2007) provide good examples of manipulation by industry and environmental groups, 
respectively. McGarity and Wagner (2008) also provide an overview of such efforts to “bend” science.
2 An extensive literature laments the legal preference for assumption over fact: see, for example, Meares & Harcourt 
(2000) and Faigman (1991, 1989).
FORDHAM LAW  41
In this paper, I explore the changes that the social sciences and empirical legal scholarship need to 
adopt to effectively channel the current flood of empirical work. My core assertion is that these fields 
need to shift primary attention away from individual studies and toward the rigorous “systematic reviews” 
that EBP has developed to synthesize entire literatures examining particular phenomena. That is not to 
say we should stop producing new studies—after all, without new work, what is there to synthesize? But 
the rigorous review must not be something done sporadically and infrequently, and that is viewed as 
“unoriginal” research. Instead, it must become both the central product of legal empiricists3 and the pri-
mary source relied on by those making empirical claims.
The argument here is not just one of degree—I am not simply proposing that systematic reviews be used 
more often.4 The focus on individual studies, or on string cites of results, is indicative of a much deeper 
problem. The empirical social sciences do not think carefully about matters of epistemology, and as a 
result they produce knowledge poorly. No new statistical technique nor methodological improvement will 
really enable empirical disciplines such as ELS to produce genuinely useful results until these fields fun-
damentally reform how they generate knowledge.
I develop three points in this paper. The first is that unless the social sciences address their epistemo-
logical shortcomings, they will not be able to properly handle the boom in empirical work driven by the 
technological revolution. Empirical social scientists are trained to think along (roughly) Popperian lines: 
the purported goal of every empirical study is to refute a null hypothesis. But this is not in fact what 
empiricists do (see, for example, Redman 1991), which leads to a serious conceptual problem, namely 
encouraging analysts to focus on individual studies rather than the literature as a whole. A single-study 
approach is valid in a Popperian world, since the discovery of one black swan refutes the hypothesis that 
all swans are white. But in practice social scientists try to measure effect sizes, since meaningful policy 
analysis requires us to know what fraction of swans are black. This, however, is estimation, not refuta-
tion—induction, not deduction. And induction requires a holistic perspective.
Fortunately, the systematic review provides a powerful way of synthesizing a wide array of empirical 
results that directly addresses these concerns. The second goal of this paper, then, is to examine how to 
design such reviews in the social sciences. The current form of review essay that the empirical social sci-
ences use—what I call the “authoritative review”5—is poorly suited to the task of producing knowledge. 
Almost all authoritative reviews, whether qualitative (narrative) or quantitative (meta-analytic), rely on 
informal, non-rigorous methods for collecting relevant studies, assessing the quality of their claims, and 
synthesizing their findings. ELS and the social sciences must embrace the more rigorous evidence based 
systematic reviews that have been revolutionizing fields like medicine and epidemiology. These employ 
well-designed protocols to gather an entire literature, evaluate the quality of the relevant studies, and 
extract a conclusion from them (see, e.g., Guzelian et al. 2005, Moher et al. 1995, and Petticrew and 
Roberts 2006). As a result, they are substantially more transparent, comprehensive, and objective than 
authoritative reviews, and thus they are significantly more reliable.
3 Unfortunately, philosophers and social scientists often use the same words for different concepts. As one of the lat-
ter, I use the social science definitions here. Thus “empiricist” refers to someone engaged in data analysis, in contrast 
to a theorist; I do not use the word to refer to those who follow, say, logical empiricism. Also, I use “positive” here to 
refer to “is” statements, in contrast to normative “ought” statements; again, I am not referring to concepts such as 
positivist schools of thought in the philosophy of science.
4 After all, meta-analyses are forms of systematic reviews, and these are used from time to time in the social sciences.
5 So-called because its reliability rests heavily (and problematically) on the analyst’s assertion of authority.
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At least in theory. Designing such reviews in practice, however, raises a host of pragmatic challenges. 
What, for example, constitutes a “high quality” study? And how do we accurately assess and measure 
that quality? Defining quality and a means of measuring it will be particularly challenging for the social 
sciences, such as ELS, that rely mainly on non-experimental, observational data. But these are essential 
questions, not just for the design of systematic reviews, but for the production of empirical knowledge in 
general. So besides laying out the theoretical benefits of systematic reviews, I also begin to explore here 
how to address the concrete problems of review construction.
I also emphasize the perhaps counterintuitive, but fundamentally important, point that failure to resolve 
these issues should not be feared as a bad thing but embraced as a good. Disagreement about what 
constitutes, or how to measure, high quality research reflects a meaningful epistemic limitation, one that 
must be acknowledged and confronted. If we cannot agree on what is high quality or how to evaluate it, 
how can we put our faith in any one study, much less be confident that we have determined the implica-
tions of an entire literature? And without such confidence, how can we expect empirical analysis to shape 
public policy in predictable and beneficial ways? We must be cognizant of, and honest about, the limits 
to the empirical claims that we make. In many ways, the philosophical revolution may act as an impor-
tant brake on the technological revolution. Where technological change may lead us to think that we can 
solve almost any problem by throwing enough data and computing power at it, the philosophical revolu-
tion encourages us to acknowledge our epistemic limitations.
The third issue I briefly explore in this paper moves away from the social sciences and considers the 
effect systematic reviews will have on the use of empirical evidence in legal settings. Courtrooms are 
often arenas for dueling partisan experts squaring off before baffled judges or jurors. Reforms to improve 
how courts use scientific evidence have been proposed for nearly three hundred years, but all have by 
and large failed (Cheng 2007, Galan 2004). Once we take a close look at how empirical disciplines tra-
ditionally produce knowledge via authoritative reviews, a surprising reason for the failure emerges. The 
problem is not (as is often stated) the differences between legal and scientific epistemologies, but the 
similarities. Knowledge production via authoritative reviews parallels strikingly such production by duel-
ing partisan experts. Like partisan experts trying to win over a legal jury, competing scientific authorities 
debate each other in an effort to sway a jury of their disciplinary peers. The epistemological shift that has 
fueled the development of quality guidelines and systematic reviews thus provides a fundamentally differ-
ent way to generate empirical knowledge and thereby creates an opportunity for meaningful reform.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part 1 briefly discusses the technological revolution of the past thirty 
years and then examines the epistemic shortcomings of current empirical scholarship in the law and the 
social sciences and the alternative offered by evidence based policy. Part 2 lays out the argument for 
replacing the current authoritative review with the systematic review developed by proponents of EBP. It 
begins by sketching the deficiencies in authoritative reviews, and it then explains the basic design of, and 
need for, systematic reviews. Part 3 addresses some of the substantive developmental challenges these 
reviews face, particularly how to define and measure quality. And Part 4 concludes with a short overview 
of how the development of systematic reviews opens the door to meaningfully reforming how complex 
scientific evidence is used in legal settings.
Before continuing, I would like to point out that most of my sources here come from medicine and epide-
miology. This is not accidental: the social sciences, including ELS, have simply not begun to address this 
issue yet in any way. I touch on some of the reasons why this may be the case below. But in the end, 
these provide only explanations, not excuses. It is essential for the social sciences to start confronting 
this issue itself.
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The Myths and Realities of Correctional Severity: Evidence from the National 
Corrections Reporting Program on Sentencing Practices
Forthcoming, American Law and Economics Review (2010)
The scope of incarceration in the United States is hard to underestimate. Approximately 1.6 million 
people are currently in prison, an incarceration rate of approximately 700 per 100,000, or nearly 1 out of 
every 130 Americans (and about 1 out of every 20 black men).1 The United States possesses only 5% 
of the world’s population, but it houses one third of its prisoners (Walmsley 2007), and cash-strapped 
states are spending nearly $40 billion per year to incarcerate them. This is a new development: the 
U.S. incarceration rate was a steady 100 per 100,000 people for nearly 50 years, from 1920 (when the 
statistics are first gathered) through 1970, at which time there were only 300,000 people in prison. The 
subsequent quintupling of prison populations is an event unseen here or abroad.
Yet equally remarkable is how little we actually understand about causes of this buildup. Researchers 
have posited a wide array of insightful theories, and in some cases they have mustered anecdotal or 
historical evidence in corroboration. But there is scant rigorous empirical evidence, and what work has 
been done has primarily taken the total stock of prisoners as the dependent variable. As I argue in Pfaff 
(2008), this stock variable is shaped by a host of concurrent and lagged factors that cannot be easily 
modeled,2 and it is ultimately unclear if these efforts have produced any well-identified estimates.
The flow variables of admissions and releases are substantially more conducive to empirical analysis. A 
few empirical studies have looked at admissions,3 but none has rigorously examined releases. This paper 
starts to fill this gap, as part of a broader empirical project examining trends in American prison popula-
tions over the past thirty years. Despite the claims and anecdotes—in media and academic writings 
alike—about the severity of contemporary sentencing policy, we have at best only a weak understanding 
of what patterns in time served actually look like. This paper provides a rich descriptive account of time 
served in prison, demonstrates that prison growth has been driven primarily by changes in admission 
policy rather than release policy, and examines how inmate characteristics such as race, ethnicity, sex, 
age, and conviction offense influence time served.
To date, investigators have made only rough forays into release policy, looking at releases through crude 
approximations of time served such as dividing the number of prisoners admitted in a given year by that 
year’s total prison population (see, e.g., Blumstein & Beck 1999).4 Taking advantage of the National 
Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP), a highly detailed—and underused—dataset, I can map (to the 
day) how the time served by individual inmates changes over a ten- to twenty-year period in a sample 
of eleven states. As a result, I am able to paint a much more detailed and nuanced picture of the time 
spent in prison and its effect on overall prison growth.
1 The recent report by the Pew Center on the States’ Public Safety Performance Project (2008) puts the incarceration 
rate at 1 out of every 100 adults. The rate is 1 out of 130 Americans of all ages.
2 The prison population in 1995 is a function of criminological, economic, political, and demographic conditions in 
1995, 1994, 1993, and so on into the past. The models done so far, however, essentially regress, say, unemployment 
in 1995 on the stock of prisoners in 1995, and it is thus unclear what the coefficient really means.
3 See Stucky et al. (2005), Nicholson-Crotty (2004), Listokin (2003), Sorensen & Stemen (2002), Marvell & Moody 
(1997, 1996), Jacobs & Helms (1996) and Marvell (1995). All but Listokin (2003), however, suffer from substantial 
identification problems (Pfaff 2008).
4 Thus if 10,000 people were admitted in 1990 and the total prison population were 100,000, this formula returns an 
average sentence length of 10 years. This would be an accurate estimate were the prison population in equilibrium, but 
during periods of change it is inaccurate.
FORDHAM LAW  45
The results stand in stark contrast to conventional wisdom, which often argues that prison growth has 
been driven by increasingly punitive, “tough-on-crime” legislatures passing harsher and harsher sentenc-
ing laws—such as mandatory minimums, truth-in-sentencing laws, two- and three-strike laws, and parole 
abolitions—even as crime rates entered their long decline in the 1990s. Media accounts of sentencing 
focus heavily on shockingly long sentences for relatively minor crimes. Academics have similarly focused 
on longer sentences: Blumstein and Beck (1999), for example, argue that 57.7% of the growth in prison 
population between 1980 and 1996 was due to longer sentences.
The results from the NCRP tell a much different story. In many states, the median time served has 
declined over much of the 1990s; so too has the 75th percentile of time served, and even the 90th in 
some cases. As I demonstrate below, it is undoubtedly clear that the United States has become more 
punitive over the past thirty years, but rarely with respect to sentence length actually served. It is our will-
ingness to incarcerate in the first place, not to keep people in prison once admitted, that appears to have 
been the fundamental engine of prison growth since the late 1980s and early 1990s.5
It is important, however, not to overstate this point. First, the rise in admissions has been driven at least 
in part by the incarceration of increasingly minor offenders, who likely serve shorter sentences; after all, 
prison populations grew during the longest recorded crime drop in American history. Comparing time 
served by those admitted in 1988 to that served by those admitted in 1998 is thus challenging, since 
the two groups are not identical—a greater fraction of those admitted in 1998 would be serving short(er) 
sentences even if sentencing policy had grown more severe. Controlling for this shift in the distribution 
of offenders yields less dramatic results, but ones that still suggest time served has frequently remained 
relatively constant or even declined.
Second, other countervailing trends may mask the effect of increasingly punitive practices. Some states, 
for example, parole prisoners quickly but violate them back aggressively—the median prisoner in California 
serves only about 180 days, but California violates nearly 30% of its parolees back to prison in any given 
year (accounting for approximately 43% of all parolees violated back in the United States).6 If a large num-
ber of inmates return to prison at least once, is the median time 180 days or 360 days? Also, capacity may 
limit time served, so were admission rates to decline, total population may decline more slowly—with more 
capacity available, states may force prisoners to serve longer fractions of their (longer) sentences.
And third, aggregate state-level quantiles may mask important differences in time served across various 
types of prisoners. To explore this issue more carefully, I develop offender-level survival models to exam-
ine the effects of race, ethnicity, sex, age, and (broadly-defined) offense type on time actually served. 
My aggregate results appear to overstate time served by non-violent and by elderly inmates, and they 
understate time served by the young and by the Hispanic. No other trait—including race—appears to 
significantly influence time served.7
5 Because of limitations in the data, I cannot compare the relative importance of admissions to that of time served prior 
to the late 1980s. [Data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, however, suggest] that increasing time served may have 
played a more important role in prison growth from the 1970s through the mid-1980s.
6 This is an approximation—180 days comes from the 2002 NCRP data, while the parole data come from the 2006 
BJS survey of parole practices (Glaze & Bonczar 2007).
7 Though employment status or, say, education could affect time served as well, the five traits list here are the only five 
consistently reported in the NCRP. Particularly disappointing is the NCRP’s failure to provide data on prior convictions: 
though officially included in the data, the entry is blank for every inmate in every state in every year.
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The results in this paper shed new, and important, light on US penal policy. First, they indicate that 
our attention to sentencing8 matters is at least partially misplaced. While institutions such as Families 
Against Mandatory Minimums and the Kennedy Commission (2004) challenge sentencing regimes such 
as mandatory minimums, most of the growth in prison population has come through admissions, an 
area that receives substantially less attention; and the one facet of admissions that receives perhaps the 
most attention—the incarceration of low-level drug offenders—is relatively unimportant.9 Tough-on-crime 
activists likewise focus on passing increasingly draconian sentences that appear to have little effect on 
actual outcomes. Reformers on both sides are thus looking in the wrong place.
Second, these results suggest that despite its great size the US prison population need not be particu-
larly stable. Rising admissions drive the current growth in prisons, and admission rates—unlike release 
rates—can change immediately.10 Again, though, it is important not to overstate this point. A small cadre 
of very-long serving inmates could exert a disproportionate effect on both the size and rate of change of 
the prison population. As a result, a one-year admissions freeze in, say, California, where the 75th per-
centile time to release is one year, need not result in the prison population falling by 75%.11  
8 To be clear, I use “sentencing” to refer to choices about how long to incarcerate someone already heading to prison, 
not the decision whether to incarcerate in the first place; that falls under “admissions.” The line, however, is not always 
clear—admission can be thought of as raising time served from zero to something greater than zero.
9 While the number of drug offenders in prison, and their share of the total prison population, has risen over the years, 
their importance peaked at about 20% of the nation’s total population. The incarceration of low-level violent and prop-
erty offenders thus appears to be much more important. 
10 Changes in sentencing policy generally operate with a lag. Reducing the sentence for burglary from ten years to six 
years will have no effect for six years (ignoring parole), while changing the admissions rate for burglary reduces the 
prison population instantly.
11 Consider the following example. A state admits 100 prisoners per year: 25 serve three-year terms, 25 serve one-year 
terms, and 50 serve six-month sentences. The median time served is six months, and the 75th-percentile one year, 
as in California. In equilibrium, the prison population at any given point is 125. If the state imposed a one-year ban on 
admissions, total population would immediately drop to 50, a 60% decline (despite 75% of all prisoners being released 
within one year). The longer the right tail, the smaller the effect of the one-year freeze: if the 25 long-timers served four 
years, the one-year freeze would result in a 43% drop from 175 to 100; if they served ten years, a 25% drop from 300 
to 225. (Conversely, if they served two years, the drop would be the full 75%.) I examine this issue more fully in Pfaff 
(2010), and I find that these long-serving inmates do not impose too strong a barrier to real reform.
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Education and the Law
Ever since Brown v. Board Of Education, American lawyers have known that the law and policies affect-
ing how and where our children are educated is a critical subject for the United States. Yet education law 
has become immeasurably more complex over the past fifty years; from vouchers to school choice to No 
Child Left Behind, the legal and policy issues on education have exploded in scope and importance.  
Fordham’s Professor Aaron Saiger is among the country’s most original and sophisticated scholars of 
education law. A former law clerk to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Editor of the Columbia Law Review, 
and Ph.D. in Public Affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Saiger conducts 
research that operates at the highest level in both law and political science. As the following excerpts 
illustrate, Saiger has made the case that we need both greater realism about the severity of the challeng-
es we face in equalizing educational outcomes, and more nuanced strategies for dealing with the facets 
of local politics that hamper educational reform. Among Professor Saiger’s most important contributions 
to the field of education law is the insight—developed in several articles—that we must move beyond the 
conflict between local control and central control of education by recognizing the definition of localities is 
itself a matter of policy choice. In education, as in voting rights, for example, Saiger argues that our politi-
cal system has the capacity to address problems by reassessing political boundaries that have merely 
been assumed.
Professor Saiger’s work takes as its starting point the difficulty of making changes in educational out-
comes through legal reform, particularly given that the primary determinants of educational achievement 
resist direct government control. Because the big drivers of educational achievement are the income, 
educational background, and zip code of a child’s parents, there are real limits on the extent to which 
legal reforms can produce greater educational equity. In Professor Saiger’s view, the law that regulates 
schools is elastic and malleable in some ways but also is independently committed to values of inertia 
and consistency. Schools are entrenched government bureaucracies and also potential sites of innovation. 
Until recently, the dominant approach to legal educational reform had been to insist upon financial 
arrangements that mitigate the problems created by local control. Many states’ supreme courts demand-
ed equalization of funding: wealthy school districts cannot spend per child as much as they would like 
so long as poor districts spend very little. This solution and others like it, Saiger tells us, have not reliably 
generated better outcomes for poor children. This is because they rest upon unproven and unwarranted 
assumptions about the technology of education—the processes that turn inputs like money and teachers 
into desired outcomes. At the same time, educational technology is no “black box”; schools and society 
are capable of better understanding, and improving, educational practice. Saiger therefore wants to 
insure that legal and institutional efforts to promote equity or effectiveness encourage the key actors in 
the educational system to experiment and vigorously to seek more efficacious educational technologies. 
In his mind, to proceed either as if we understand the relationships between educational inputs and out-
puts, or as if such relationships are a “black box” irreducibly resistant to our understanding, is to insist 
that we leave schools, too many of which are failing in their missions, largely free to resist accountability 
and change. 
Aaron Saiger
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Excerpts
Local Government without Tiebout
41 Urban Lawyer 93 (2009)
By purchasing or renting a home, one also purchases or rents a basket of local public goods. What is in 
that basket, along with its associated tax burden, can matter to a prospective resident at least as much as 
acreage or the size of the master bedroom. And a defining feature of American local government is that the 
content of the local public goods basket varies dramatically from place to place.
This substantial and ubiquitous interjurisdictional variation in the availability of local public goods elicits 
widely divergent normative assessments, often in literatures that routinely talk past one another. Literatures 
on local and regional government, environmental justice, school finance and other public goods frequently 
regard interlocal variation as insidious because it correlates with wealth. The very poor, such arguments 
run, know too well that they will be stressed at least as much by the pathologies of a destitute neighbor-
hood—high crime, bad schools, dirty air, and inferior public services—as by the low quality of their own, 
individual housing. The wealthy correspondingly can expect their expensive homes to be surrounded by 
similar homes on similarly large lots, with access to top-notch public schools and other public amenities. To 
require the poor to purchase public goods along with private housing (and other necessities) ensures that 
they will get little of either. But access to public goods, such arguments continue, should not depend upon 
private means. 
Other literatures, primarily economic but also in political theory, celebrate variation in the provision of local 
public goods. They understand it as an inevitable consequence of allowing residents to choose among 
localities and simultaneously empowering those localities to determine what public goods they will offer 
their residents, and to levy taxes accordingly—two policies with considerable appeal. Empowered local poli-
ties facilitate individual political participation, which can be distressingly attenuated with respect to more 
distant state and national authorities. They permit people to band together in order to pursue diverse ways 
of life and diverse preferences. They facilitate experiment.
Perhaps most important, residential mobility across empowered localities promotes efficiency in the pro-
duction and allocation of local public goods. Charles Tiebout argued, a half-century ago, that mobile resi-
dents permitted to sort themselves among various localities, each offering different bundles of local public 
goods and associated taxation, will select the package that they prefer most. Localities’ concomitant adap-
tation to residents’ preferences tethers the production of public goods to people’s desires and willingness 
to pay. These efficiency advantages can be had only where local governments make their own decisions 
about taxing and spending. 
This Article makes two arguments. [First, it] identifies the problems that critics associate with variation 
in local public goods as challenges to Tiebout sorting, not to robust local autonomy. Because efficiency 
assumes a budget constraint—goods are efficiently allocated if they go to those most willing to pay for 
them—efficiency in the distribution of public goods helps the rich more than the poor. When, as they often 
do, preferences for public goods themselves correlate with wealth, allocative efficiency further encourages 
the rich to withdraw into enclaves that exclude the poor, and to focus on providing public goods only for 
themselves. Such a system sacrifices equity, democratic values and even productive efficiency. 
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But these are objections to sorting, not to the empowerment of local governments. Autonomy has valuable 
features, independent of sorting, that do not promote inequality. Therefore, the appropriate response to 
the correlation between wealth and the quality of public goods is not to supplant local government, as has 
been suggested, with state or regional government, with markets or with hybrid institutions. Rather, it is to 
maintain local government while seeking to undermine sorting. Critics should seek, in short, local autonomy 
without Tiebout.
[Second, the Article] argues that election law offers a well-developed paradigm that can advance this objec-
tive. Both constituting local jurisdictions for the purpose of electoral representation—voting districts—and 
constituting local jurisdictions for the purpose of providing local public goods—local governments—require 
the aggregation of persons on a geographical basis so that they can conduct local politics. But doctrine 
diverges enormously with respect to how such aggregation is accomplished. The fixed boundaries of local 
governments facilitate a Tieboutian ratchet of increasing wealth in the most successful jurisdictions and 
a concomitant spiral of poverty in the unsuccessful. The boundaries of electoral districts, by contrast, are 
drawn and redrawn subject to principles of equity and fairness: one-person-one-vote, along with secondary 
prohibitions on some forms of dilution of minority groups’ voting power. Such principles are imposed from 
outside the local politics that districts are created to actualize.
Even the few who have discerned the parallels between electoral districts and local governments have not 
recognized that the central institution that might effectively protect localism while undermining sorting is 
periodic redistricting. Just as electoral districts are periodically redrawn in the face of population changes 
to ensure continued adherence to one-person-one-vote and other subsidiary rules, so local government 
boundaries could be periodically redrawn to dilute concentrations of wealth or poverty that otherwise 
accrete in particular jurisdictions. But just as electoral districts once redrawn proceed on the principle 
of local plurality rule, so too would redrawn local governments continue autonomously to tax and spend. 
However, because local boundaries would react to the development of enclaves of wealth or poverty, exist-
ing residents would be substantially less able to choose, permanently, the characteristics of their neighbors. 
Voice would be strengthened and exit weakened.
[The Article also] considers two objections to the claim that a system of local governments based upon 
periodic redistricting preserves the advantages of local autonomy while avoiding the costs of Tiebout sort-
ing. It considers first whether periodic redistricting would vitiate the normative desirability of local autonomy, 
by attenuating citizens’ connections with their localities or by drastically constraining the ability of like-
minded groups collectively to constitute new jurisdictions more to their liking. It then analyzes whether, by 
making interjurisdictional exit more difficult, redistricting would encourage citizens to seek substitutes for 
public goods in private markets and in that way reduce public support for public expenditures. Such reduc-
tions could hurt the poor as much or more than Tiebout sorting.
While these problems will certainly arise, the nature of redistricting will cabin their magnitude. Ultimately, 
redistricting local government would not reduce citizens’ interest in and support for their localities as 
much as it would create new incentives for citizens additionally to concern themselves with the quality and 
quantity of goods provided regionally—because parts of that region could be part of their locality in the 
future. Redistricting is thus a proposal for a new “new regionalism,” which would build a regional politics 
not through the creation of governmental or extra-governmental institutions, but by broadening the private 
incentives of individual voters.
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School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” Schools
48 Boston College Law Review 909 (2007)
I.  THE BASELINE MARKET FOR SCHOOLING
Schooling is compulsory in all fifty states. In 1925, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the U.S. Supreme Court 
acknowledged this to be a genuine restraint upon freedom and consumer sovereignty, but justified it 
nevertheless in light of the strong state interest in an educated populace. But Pierce also established 
that, notwithstanding compulsory education, parents have the liberty to remove their children from state-
sponsored “public” schools and educate them instead in private institutions: “The fundamental theory of 
liberty … excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept 
instruction from public teachers only.” 
By forbidding the prohibition of private schooling, Pierce requires states to tolerate a market for private 
schooling. But schooling is not a typical consumer good; both demand and supply in the industry are 
highly regulated by government. On the demand side, that schooling is compulsory means that parents 
cannot substitute goods that they might prefer for education. On the supply side, education is subsidized, 
with government ensuring that every student can attend some school without charge. Prices, entry, and 
exit from the market therefore cannot and do not work in standard ways.
By “relax[ing] constraints on students’ mobility among schools,” charters, vouchers, and similar initiatives 
introduce additional competition into the educational quasi-market. Vouchers—state subsidies that par-
ents may direct to private schools in which they enroll their children—reconfigure the school type market 
by reducing the barrier that cost presents to parents who would otherwise prefer private to public educa-
tion. In addition, the various forms of public education, and the facilitation of choice among them, have 
proliferated. For example, often in an effort to promote both racial integration and school quality, many 
states and districts supplement traditional, state-managed public schools (that all children from a given 
area attend) with magnet schools. Quality concerns also motivate districts to enter into contracts with pri-
vate educational management organizations (“EMOs”), which provide not just administrative services but 
general management to struggling public schools. 
The most dramatic market-based reform in the public school sector is the charter school. Chartering 
permits groups of educational entrepreneurs from both within and without an existing public system to 
constitute a public school not subject to the full panoply of rules and procedures imposed by the school 
district in which it is located; the extent of regulatory relief varies by state. Charter schools receive state 
money for each student who chooses to enroll, money that otherwise would go to those students’ tradi-
tionally assigned public schools. The charter school sector is growing explosively. 
II. CHOICE UNDER THE EDUCATION CLAUSES
Given this perspective on what “school choice” programs do, what limits should the education clauses 
be seen as placing upon them? … Every state constitution has a clause that discusses primary and sec-
ondary education. … [These] clauses, although they vary in scope and in specific language, generally 
deploy subsets of a constellation of key terms: education should be “thorough,” “public,” “common,” 
“free,” “general,” “uniform,” “efficient.”
These requirements constrain the organization of school systems in two ways. First, school finance cases in 
many states have held that terms in the education clauses like “thorough,” “equal,” and “efficient” impose 
the substantive duty upon states to ensure that all children are educated adequately and/or equally. … At 
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the same time, the clauses speak directly to the organization of educational institutions. Requirements that 
state-supported schooling be “free,” “uniform,” “common,” and “public” can be read to require some orga-
nizational approaches and arguably to preclude others. Even if it were to be established that school choice 
promoted educational adequacy and equity, state support for charter or voucher programs might still be 
foreclosed by requirements that such support be limited to “common,” “public,” “free,” and/or “uniform” 
schools. Moreover, requirements that schooling be “thorough” or “efficient” have an independent institu-
tional dimension. Whether “efficient” is read as a mandate for productive efficiency, in the sense of mini-
mizing cost-per-output and avoiding waste, or allocative efficiency, in the sense of seizing potential Pareto 
improvements and minimizing deadweight loss, the term on its face has more to say about how schooling is 
structured than about the nature of the product that it generates. 
Until recently, whether choice is directly precluded by institutional language received relatively little judi-
cial attention. In 2006, however, in Ohio ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Board of 
Education, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the argument that the state’s charter school legislation was 
facially inconsistent with the Ohio education clause’s requirement of “a thorough and efficient system of 
common schools throughout the state.” The court emphasized that community schools (as charters are 
called in Ohio) incorporate “flexibility,” “choice,” “customiz[ation],” and “experimen[t]” to help “ensur[e] 
that all children receive an adequate education that complies with the Thorough and Efficient Clause.” 
The court held that rational judgment, coupled with charters’ ultimate susceptibility to public control, to 
be sufficient to meet the constitutional requirements of commonness, thoroughness, and efficiency. 
The Florida Supreme Court, in the 2006 case Bush v. Holmes, took the opposite approach in invalidat-
ing the state’s Opportunity Scholarship Program (“OSP”), which provided school vouchers, redeemable 
at private, tuition-charging schools as well as public schools, to students previously enrolled in public 
schools that the state had categorized as “failing.” The Florida court reasoned that because vouchers 
“diver[t]” funds from free public schools to private schools, they undermine “the system of ‘high quality”’ 
schools that the state constitution requires. Furthermore, said the court, the constitution requires state 
support of schools both “free” and “public,” quality aside; private schools receiving vouchers are neither. 
Because the OSP funds schools subject to less extensive regulation than the public schools, the court 
found that it violates the requirement that the public school “system be ‘uniform.”’ Finally, the Florida 
court concluded—over a vigorous dissent—that the Florida constitution specifies a single “manner”  
by which the state may discharge its duty to educate school-age children, that being a “uniform, high 
quality system of free public education.” Choice is not allowed even if it meets the state’s educational 
goals: the constitution, says the court, “does not authorize additional equivalent alternatives.” 
Although Holmes invalidated a voucher program, its reasoning clearly extends beyond vouchers to charter 
schools. If OSP’s “diversion” of funds from public schools to private ones unconstitutionally undermines 
public schools, charter schools’ similar diversion is unconstitutional as well. And if a voucher program vio-
lates the “uniformity” provision because voucher schools are subject to regulations less intrusive and oner-
ous than traditional schools, charter schools, whose sine qua non is regulatory relief, violate it similarly. 
III. RECONCILING CHOICE AND THE CLAUSES
[S]chool choice should be viewed as consistent with education clauses if they meet two criteria. First, 
choice programs must be reasonably expected to result in education of adequate quality. Second, the 
choice programs must provide, so long as not inconsistent with the first criterion, parents with a genuine 
and independent choice among educational providers.
The first half of the proposed test—a reasonable connection to improving educational quality—is intended 
to be one that can easily be met by most choice and privatization proposals. Well-developed theoretical 
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arguments support the view that choice and privatization have the potential to improve educational quality, 
although empirical demonstrations of such benefits are contested and far from robust.  
In contrast, the second part of the test—that choice, if provided, be genuine and independent—
does limit the design of choice. It borrows from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2002 holding in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris that, under the Federal Establishment Clause, private individuals may direct state-provid-
ed voucher funds to religious and secular schools, so long as their choice to do so is “genuine and inde-
pendent.” The test proposed here similarly requires that choice programs multiply, rather than frustrate, 
the ability of parents to exercise choice in the educational marketplace.
Why incorporate Zelman’s holding into the analysis of the education clauses? Although it is obviously desir-
able from the point of view of those who might establish school choice programs that two separate consti-
tutional mandates could be satisfied by the application of a single rule, this is scarcely a sufficient reason to 
import the rule of Zelman into the education-rights area. The Establishment Clause and education clauses 
guarantee different rights, different kinds of rights, and appear in different varieties of constitutions.
Nevertheless, I argue, Zelman offers an approach to the market for schooling that usefully informs educa-
tion rights as well as Establishment analysis. This is because the Court in Zelman understood the Cleveland 
voucher program as an effort by the State of Ohio to catalyze a pluralist market for schooling, rather than as 
an effort to subsidize individuals’ static preferences for religious education. 
The extent of this departure has not been widely recognized. Zelman is generally categorized as an “aid” or 
“funding” case, along with such other Supreme Court cases as Mitchell v. Helms, Agostini v. Felton, Zobrest 
v. Catalina Foothills School District, Witters v. Wisconsin Department of Services for the Blind, and Mueller v. 
Allen, because it involves government spending in aid of religious schools. … Indeed, the phrase “genuine 
and independent choice” is not a new coinage but taken directly from Mitchell and Agostini. 
In the earlier K–12 aid cases, however, government subsidies were conceptualized as efforts to cushion 
the pain associated with a decision to pay tuition to private schools when public schooling could be had 
for free. Theoretically, there can be no doubt that a tax credit like that upheld in Mueller, or tuition sav-
ings like that generated by the in-kind aid upheld in Mitchell and Agostini, will, by changing the effective 
price of religious relative to public schools, result in some marginal parent-consumer changing her pref-
erence between the two. Nevertheless, until Zelman, the marginal case is absent from the Court’s opin-
ions. Indeed, the Court repeatedly dismisses the possibility that preferences might respond to changes 
in effective prices. Rather, the cases focus on the inframarginal consumers, those already choosing reli-
gious school. Pre-Zelman choice matters only because private citizens make choices freely, uncoerced 
by government; the question is whether government, accepting the legitimacy of their choices, may help 
alleviate the costs private citizens have chosen to bear. Therefore, the Rehnquist Court’s aid cases are 
full of talk about choice, but until Zelman no talk about markets.
The raison d’être of a voucher program, by contrast, is to catalyze choices different than those parents 
were previously making. Indeed, the possibility that vouchers might simply subsidize parents already 
using private schools, leading to no change in enrollment patterns, is often viewed as a flaw of such pro-
grams. The innovation of Zelman, therefore, was to recast the Court’s “genuine and independent choice” 
rule, developed to permit government subsidies because they would not influence private choices, to 
apply to programs in which the state sought, specifically and explicitly, to influence those choices. But 
that influence was to be of a particular kind: the state would extend the range of choice by creating mar-
kets, including markets that embraced religious sellers, to replace government monopoly. 
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Although this move is not implied by Mueller, Agostini, or Zobrest, it is a justifiable innovation. It rests 
on an understanding of markets as a device for aggregating and fulfilling private preferences that differs 
fundamentally from democratic decision making. In the latter, the aggregation of private preferences is 
the “public” will, and the clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that government may not, in 
obedience to such public will, advance religion. The point of Zelman is that a government that creates a 
market that includes religious institutions is doing something else: it is facilitating private choices, in the 
aggregate, without imposing its own will or establishing its own preferences. Zelman legitimates this kind 
of pluralist, public support for religious preference—one that not only supports all choices once made, 
but also actively seeks to make such choices more available to more people—because with markets, 
government can avoid putting its thumb on the scale regarding the content of individual choices.
Although the scope of choice programs is often thought to vary inversely with their publicness, the converse 
seems more accurate. It is true that robust choice decreases enrollment in traditional “public” schools, 
diverts funds that otherwise would have flowed to those schools, and mitigates the direct influence of “pub-
lic” regulation. But these observations, although sound, reflect a statist critique of choice. Once the deci-
sion is made to permit pluralist choice, the norms of access, fairness, quality promotion, and a disconnect 
between opportunities and ability to pay can and ought to govern the design of choice programs. “Genuine 
and independent choice” offers a promising operationalization of those norms that is both institutional-
ist and instrumentalist. When options under a choice program are varied and arise in response to market 
demand, there is public input into their design—to be sure, input mediated through a market instead of 
through political and bureaucratic institutions, but public nonetheless. When the number of options is not 
artificially constrained, more people have access to schools of choice and those schools are in that sense 
more public. The same is true when no point of view is a priori preferred in designing school options. And 
when profound underfunding of choice schools is barred as anticompetitive, the schools are more “free.” 
Moreover, because robust choice is Pareto superior to nonrobust choice with respect to parents, it, in an 
important sense, contributes to the requirement that schools be “efficient.”
At the same time, “genuine and independent” choice as I define it does not set the constitutional bar so 
high that choice programs become unrealistic or unworkable. The test permits states to cap their expenses 
at acceptable levels. It allows market choice to be limited. It preserves both the right to have “free” schools 
and the right to pay for schools. And perhaps most important, it creates diverse schools to serve a diverse 
population of learners—an approach which, although the antithesis of uniformity in the institutional-design 
sense, promotes equality of educational opportunity in a world where all children are different.
Programs based upon “genuine and independent” choice also offer a different compromise than traditional 
statist schools with respect to states’ Pierce obligation to tolerate an educational market and to localism. 
[S]tates have long circumscribed markets for schooling by offering parents only the option either to send 
their children, without charge, to a public school in the district in which they live, or to pay to educate 
them privately. This is one approach to regulating the educational marketplace; it is most emphatically not 
a policy that disappears the market or renders it nugatory. The recognition that markets, even imperfect 
ones, can enhance the scope of private choice and simultaneously fulfill public values suggests that this 
single, grudging, and biased variety of market regulation—grudging in its limitation of options and biased 
in its preference for those who can afford private education, those who live in districts with good schools, 
and those whose preferences regarding schooling are similar to their neighbors’—is not the only policy that 
might be characterized as making a school system “free,” “public,” “uniform,” or “common.” Statist dimen-
sions of publicness like democratic deliberation and state provision, along with within-school diversity may 
suffer under choice; but replacing district-based, stratified, and low-quality educational monopolies with 
market institutions is in other ways more responsive to the public will, more free, and more uniform than 
the dichotomous … choice today imposed upon rich and poor alike.
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